Louisiana Constitutional Law by Devlin, John
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 54 | Number 3
January 1994
Louisiana Constitutional Law
John Devlin
Louisiana State University Law Center
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 54 La. L. Rev. (1994)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol54/iss3/9
Louisiana Constitutional Law
John Devlin*
During the past two terms,' the Louisiana appellate courts have issued a
number of decisions interpreting a variety of Louisiana constitutional provisions.
Two themes, however, are pervasive. One is substantive, comprising the courts'
continuing effort to define the talismanic concept of constitutional "privacy" in
all of its manifestations: the fight to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures,2 the right to avoid collection and disclosure of personal information
("disclosural" privacy), 3 and the right to make certain choices about one's
personal or family life ("autonomy" privacy).' The other theme is
methodological; it involves the ongoing debate within the Louisiana Supreme
Court regarding the relation between the federal and state constitutions, 5 and the
limits which the state constitution places on the state legislature.6
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. Thanks to Lee
Hargrave for his counsel, to Kevin Sneesby for his research assistance, and to Lisa, sine qua non.
1. Since no discussion of Louisiana Constitutional Law was included in the last
"Developments" issue, this article will consider decisions of both the 1991-1992 and 1992-1993
terms.
2. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707 (La.), aff'd, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993), discussed
infra at notes 52-73.
3. See discussion infra at note 126.
4. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992), discussed infra at notes 7-47; Sudwischer
v. Estate of Hoffpaiur. 589 So. 2d 474 (La. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992), discussed
infra at notes 93-122. See also infra notes 87-88 & 123-128 discussing other applications of this
concept to problems of criminal procedure and individual ights, respectively.
5. Compare Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
ingingly declared its adherence to the principles of the "new judicial federalism," holding that where
an appeal raises both federal and state constitutional issues, Louisiana courts should resolve the state
constitutional issues first and reaffirming that interpretation of state constitutional rights should be
independent from interpretation of cognate federal constitutional fights by federal courts, with Tucker,
626 So. 2d 707, aff'd, 626 So. 2d 720 (La. 1993), in which the same court, during the same term,
appeared to abandon these principles, reinterpreting the definition of "seizure" under the Louisiana
constitution so as to mimic recent changes in federal interpretation of the federal Constitution, rather
than follow its own independent state-based precedents. These cases are discussed infra at notes 7-47
and 52-73, respectively, and accompanying text.
6. Compare Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993), in which the state supreme court
held, in effect, that the state constitutional provision which directs the legislature to "suppress"
gambling did not place significant limits on that body's discretion regarding the extent to which
gambling should be permitted, with Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993), holding that
the state constitution precluded the legislature from radically modifying the rules of forced
heirship-even though the constitution expressly gave the legislature power to determine who is a
forced heir and what that heir's forced portion will be. These cases are discussed infra at notes 144-
195 and accompanying text.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS
A. State v. Perry: Of Insanity, Forced Medication, and the Primacy of the
State Constitution
The specific issue decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
Perry7-- whether the Louisiana Constitution permits authorities to forcibly
administer antipsychotic drugs to an insane prisoner under a sentence of death,
and then to execute him while he is under the influence of those drugs-is a
narrow one, unlikely to be often repeated.8 Nonetheless, the case represents an
important step in the Louisiana Supreme Court's ongoing relationship with its
federal counterpart, and a significant milestone in the interpretation of the state
constitution's guarantees of privacy and humane treatment of prisoners.
In 1983, Michael Perry stood trial for the murder of his parents and several
other relatives. Despite a history of mental problems, the trial court found him
competent to stand trial.9 He was convicted on five counts of murder and
sentenced to death. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction, but indicated that further review of Perry's competency to be
executed "might be in order."'" Thereafter, the trial court convened a sanity
commission and conducted hearings on that issue. The experts testified, and the
trial court found, that Perry suffered from an incurable schizo-affective disorder
"that causes his days to be a series of hallucinations, delusional and disordered
thinking, incoherent speech, and manic behavior,"" but that these symptoms
could be ameliorated by medication. 2 The trial court concluded that Perry was
competent for execution only while he was taking that medication. It ordered
7. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992). A more detailed consideration of this case, and its implications,
will be the subject of a student Note, which is currently scheduled to be published in a future issue
of this Review.
8. Since a criminal defendant must be adjudged mentally "competent" in order to stand trial
and be sentenced in the first instance, these problems ought only arise with respect to the presumably
small number of death row inmates who were competent at the time of trial, but who become
incompetent before sentence is carried out. Moreover, problems of forcible medication in order to
execute will only arise if the condemned prisoner's insanity is of a type that responds to medication.
9. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748. As the court noted. Perry was initially diagnosed as
schizophrenic at the age of 16, twelve years before the murders. He was committed to mental
institutions several times during the intervening years because of psychotic symptoms. The issue of
Perry's competence to stand trial was raised at the outset of the criminal proceedings against him.
The initial sanity commission, appointed by Judge Hymel, recommended that Perry be transferred
to a state mental facility for evaluation. He was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia
and treated with Haldol and other anti-psychotic drugs. Eighteen months later, Judge Hymel
appointed a second sanity commission, which found that Perry was competent to stand trial. Over
the objection of Perry's trial counsel, Perry was penfitted to withdraw his initial plea of "not guilty
by reason of insanity" and went to trial on a simple plea of "not guilty."
10. State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 564 (1986).
11. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748.
12. The primary medicine prescribed was Haldol. td. at 747.
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that he be kept on medication, by force if necessary, and that the execution
proceed. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Perry's application for writs and
dismissed his appeal.
1 3
But the case did not end there. The United States Supreme Court granted
Perry's application for certiorari.14  After briefing and argument, the Court
remanded for reconsideration in light of its then-recent decision in Washington
v. Harper,5 which permitted involuntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs
to convicted mentally ill prisoners, where the prison authorities found those drugs
necessary in order to avoid danger to prison staff or to other inmates.16 After
reconsideration, without additional evidence, the trial court in Perry reinstated
its original order. Once again, Perry appealed. This time, the Louisiana
Supreme Court granted writs 7 and ieversed the trial court's order.
Justice Dennis' opinion for the Perry majority began by reiterating the
familiar rule that a prisoner convicted of a capital offense cannot be executed
unless he is mentally competent.' Though its origin and purposes are ob-
13. State v. Perry, 543 So. 2d 487 (1989); State v. Perry, 543 So. 2d 487 (1989) (Dixon, C.J.
and Calogero and Dennis JJ., dissenting as to the denial of writs).
14. Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 1015-16, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
15. 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
16. Id. at 222-36. Harper's challenge was based wholly on the federal Constitution and had
both substantive and procedural aspects. Harper's substantive claim was that he had a right, based
in concepts of "autonomy" privacy which the Court had recognized in cases ranging from Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) to Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), to refuse the medication, and that such right could not be
overridden absent a showing that involuntary medication was closely related to a sufficiently
important state interest. With Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for a five-judge majority, the Court
held, in essence, that all federal constitutional rights of inmates, even those deemed "fundamental,"
can be overridden whenever the prison authorities meet the relatively low threshold of showing that
the override is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Harper, 494 U.S. at 223, 110
S. Ct. at 1037. Applying this principle, the Court held that the state has a legitimate interest in
securing the safety of prison inmates and staff, and that the prison's drug treatment policy was
rationally related to that goal of prison safety. Id. at 222-27, 110 S. Ct. at 1037-40. With respect
to Harper's purely procedural claims, the majority concluded that Perry had a protected "liberty"
interest to refuse medication but held that the procedures provided, even though they did not provide
for representation by an attorney or for judicial review of the institution's decision to forcibly
medicate an inmate, gave inmates a federally constitutionally sufficient opportunity to contest the
necessity of that medication. Id. at 228-36, 110 S. Ct. 1040-44. Justices Stevens, Brennan and
Marshall, dissenting in part, argued that the majority had undervalued the federal constitutional issues
at stake. Id. at 237-38, 110 S. Ct. at 1045.
17. State v. Perry, 584 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1991).
18. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 749-50 (La. 1992). The majority did not define the precise
degree of mental competence required for execution since Perry, unmedicated, was clearly
incompetent under any reasonable definition of the term. Justice Marcus, dissenting, argued for
adoption of the two-pronged standard for competence for execution previously articulated by Justice
Powell in the context of federal law-that a condemned prisoner cannot be executed absent "the
ability of one to understand the death penalty and the reason one is to suffer that penalty"-as the
standard to govern mental capacity to undergo execution in this state. Id. at 774 (citing Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 420, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2607 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)). This
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scure,"9 this prohibition has long been, and remains, an unchallenged postulate
of both federal20 and Louisiana 21 jurisprudence. The question thus became
whether Perry could be forcibly medicated and then-after the medication took
effect and he achieved the requisite degree of competence-executed. To resolve
these issues, the court began by clearing the conceptual decks: reaffirming that
state courts should, where possible, resolve cases on state rather than federal
constitutional bases2" and distinguishing Harper, primarily on the ground that
medication for the purpose of readying an inmate for execution was not in the
inmate's "best interests" and therefore could not be considered "medical
treatment" as that term was used in Harper.23 Considering the case as one of
standard, if adopted, would constitute a lower threshold of capacity than is required in Louisiana to
demonstrate an accused's competence to stand trial. Compare State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129,
1136-37 (La. 1977) (on rehearing), holding that when any mental defect is "so severe as to impair
a defendant's capacity to understand the object, nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him, to consult with counsel in a meaningful way, and to assist rationally in his defense, that
defendant is, within the contemplation of our law, incompetent to stand trial."
19. As Justice Dennis noted, the traditional common law prohibition against executing the
insane appears to be rooted in multiple moral, ethical, and theological considerations-including
concerns that a person unable to make arguments on his own behalf might, for that reason, be
wrongly executed, that it is mere cruelty to execute one who is not responsible for his actions nor
able to understand what is happening to him, and that it is "uncharitable" to kill a person who his
unable to make his peace with his maker. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 749. Put in more modem terms, it
could be argued that executing the insane serves neither "deterrence" nor "retribution" functions. The
insane cannot be deterred, and execution of an incompetent arguably lacks the quality of moral
equivalence necessary to offset the initial murder. Id. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. &
David W. Louisell, Death, the State and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. Rev. 381 (1962);
Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and Jurisprudential
Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 51 La. L. Rev. 995 (1991).
20. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986), holding that execution
of an insane prisoner would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.
21. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 80 So. 2d 863 (La. 1955); State v. Allen, 204 La. 514, 15 So. 2d
870 (1943); State ex rel. Paine v. Potts, 49 La. Ann. 1500, 22 So. 738 (1897). Although the
prohibition against executing the insane clearly predates the present Louisiana Declaration of Rights,
the Perry court explicitly rooted this prohibition in La. Const. art. 1, § 20, which extends beyond the
federal Eighth Amendment to prohibit euthanasia and torture, as well as cruel, excessive, or unusual
punishments. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 750.
22. Id. at 750-51.
23. Id. at 751-55. In support of the distinction, the majority noted that the program of forcible
medication approved in that case was initiated by physicians and found to be in the prisoner's own
best medical interests, as well as required for reasons of institutional safety. In contrast, the program
of forcible medication at issue in Perry was initiated by the prosecutorial arm of the state and, since
it would ultimately result in the patient's execution, not in his best interests, medical or otherwise.
Moreover, the majority found that while the forcible medication approved in Harper was compatible
with standard medical ethics, a physician would be placed in an impossible ethical position if he
knew, as here, that the medication he was forcing on an inmate would proximately result in that
inmate's death. For all these reasons, the court concluded that the forcible medication at issue in
Perry simply did not constitute "medical treatment" of the sort authorized by Harper, but was rather
an integral part of the process of execution, engaged in solely for the purpose of punishment. But
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first impression under the Louisiana constitution, the court concluded that such
forcible medication for the purpose of readying a prisoner for execution violated
both the "privacy" guarantee of Section 524 and the "humane treatment"
guarantee of Section 2025 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights.
1. On the Primacy and Independence of the Declaration of Rights
Potentially the most far-reaching aspect of Perry is its insistence on
resolving the case on purely state, rather than federal constitutional, grounds. 26
Justice Dennis' majority opinion held that if an appeal raises both federal and
state constitutional issues, Louisiana courts ordinarily should, as a matter of
principle, resolve the state constitutional issues first.27  Where such a state-
see Justice Marcus, dissenting, arguing that the process of medication is conceptually distinguishable
from the question of what the state may do to the prisoner after he attains the required degree of
sanity. For Justice Marcus, that process of medication, viewed in isolation, is similar to that
approved in Harper, which should govern this case. Id. at 775-77 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 755-61.
25. Id. at 761-71.
26. Since the sole impetus and opportunity for the Louisiana courts' final round of opinions
in Perry was the United States Supreme Court's remand for reconsideration in light of the federal
constitutional rulings in Harper, the Louisiana court's choice to resolve the case on purely state
grounds may appear to raise a problem regarding the "ratcheting" effect of sequential consideration
of federal and state constitutional issues. If the state constitution were the only applicable source of
rights, Perry would have been executed after the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs in 1989. If
the federal Constitution were the only applicable source of rights, Perry could be medicated and
executed if, as the trial court found, the federal constitutional analysis articulated in Harper would
so permit. Apparently, then, it was only by the interaction of the Louisiana and United States
Supreme Courts and the two bodies of law that Perry was spared.
Such an objection is, however, more apparent than real. It is well established that, once a
Louisiana appellate court has a case before it, it has the authority to consider any issue of law raised
by the record on appeal and to "render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record
on appeal," regardless of the particular grounds of appeal or whether the particular point was argued.
La. Code Civ. P. 2164; Givens v. Richland-Morris Agency, Inc., 369 So. 2d 1184'(La. App. 2d Cir.
1979); Norman v. City of Shreveport, 141 So. 2d 903 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). Nothing in the
Supreme Court's remand could or did foreclose the state courts from considering any relevant issues
of state law. That the federal ruling gave the Louisiana courts a final opportunity to reconsider all
issues in the case-state as well as federal-was nothing more than a happenstance that worked to
Perry's benefit.
27. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 750-51 (La. 1992). According to Perry, the only
circumstance in which it would be "understandable" for a state court to decide a case on federal, and
not state, constitutional grounds, would be if "well-settled, clearly applicable federal precedent is
available." Even in these circumstances, however, failure to consider state constitutional claims first
was characterized as "not entirely proper." Id. at 751. The court relied on four arguments to support
this methodological principle: 1) that unnecessary decisions of federal law would be avoided; 2) that
decisions based on state grounds are more "efficient" in that they are not subject to any further
review in the federal Supreme Court; 3) that the state constitution may be more expansive in its
protection of rights than the federal constitution; and 4) that the framers of the federal Constitution
originally intended state courts and state constitutions to be the primary legal guarantors of liberty.
Id. at 750-51.
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based decision resolves the case, the federal claims need not be reached. Thus,
Perry appeared to place Louisiana, if it was not already, clearly and squarely in
the camp of those states which have asserted the primacy and independence of
state constitutional analysis.28
The consequences of such a commitment-if sustained-should not be
underestimated. To be sure, the outcomes of particular cases will remain the
same regardless of the order in which state and federal constitutional claims are
considered. Because of the supremacy of federal law, federal constitutional
guarantees provide an irreducible minimum level of protection of those rights.
State constitutional rights can add to this minimum, but only so long as those
additional state-granted rights do not conflict with federally protected rights of
other private parties.29 These relations do not change depending on which
source of rights is considered first. Nor is there any logical reason why a court
that considered federal constitutional claims first could not apply wholly
independent analyses to cognate state claims. Nonetheless, a practice of
considering state constitutional issues first would force state courts to decide
those issues in all cases in which they are raised, and might reduce, at least to
some extent, the ingrained tendency of lawyers and judges to rely on federal
Some counterarguments could be raised to such an approach, however. Passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly altered the original framers' perception of the respective roles of the state and
federal governments as guarantors of rights. And, as Justice Cole.implied in his Perry dissent, id.
at 778 n.l, a court's decision to resolve a case on state rather than federal constitutional grounds
could reflect no more than a state court's result-oriented disagreement with the federal Court and a
strategic desire to shield its conclusions from federal review-an approach that has been criticized
by some commentators as unprincipled and destructive because it tends to balkanize effective
protection of basic rights. See generally Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights:
The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 Denv. U. L. Rev. 85 (1985); Earl M. Maltz, False Proph-
et-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 429 (1988);
Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 995 (1985); Todd F. Simon,
Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of Expression, 33 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 305 (1985).
Despite these points, however, the weight of argument favors the position taken by the Perry
majority. State courts have an independent responsibility to interpret their respective state
constitutions, a duty which they should not seek to avoid. Excessive reliance on federal law--either
to resolve a case so that state constitutional issues need not be addressed, or as a guide to
interpretation of cognate state guarantees-could constitute just such an exercise in avoidance.
Consideration of state constitutional issues first, in contrast, assures that state constitutional rights
guarantees will receive the independent consideration they deserve, without losing the benefit of the
"floor" of individual rights provided by the federal Bill of Rights. See discussion infra at notes 52-73
and accompanying text.
28. But see State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707 (La.), aft'd, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993), discussed infra
at notes 52-73 and accompanying text. The issues mentioned here-the extent to which state
constitutional rights guarantees should be interpreted independently of federal analogues, and whether
those state guarantees should be considered "primary" or merely "interstitial"-have engendered a
substantial body of commentary. See generally Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory
and State Courts, 18 G. L. Rev. 165 (1984); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379 (1980).
29. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
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precedent as defining the terms of constitutional debate.3° Thus, Perry's
assertion of state constitutional primacy will, if heeded by litigants and courts,
contribute significantly to the continued and independent development of
Louisiana constitutional law.
2. "Autonomy" Privacy and the Right to Refuse Psychoactive Drugs
In Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher,3' the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
Section 5 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights32 incorporates a guarantee of
privacy in its "autonomy" sense; that this includes the right to determine whether
to accept medical treatment; and that the state cannot burden an adult's right to
make free and knowing choices in such areas of personal autonomy absent a
compelling state interest. 33  In Perry, the Court reaffirmed these conclusions
and extended them, holding that Perry retained some state constitutionally
protected autonomy interests despite his status as a convicted prisoner, 34 and
that, absent compelling justification, Section 5 precludes the government both
from physically invading a person's body and from seeking to control a person's
mind and thoughts by any means, however that might be accomplished.35 The
court concluded that involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs would
implicate Perry's Section 5 "autonomy" rights in three related, but distinguish-
able, ways-by "violat[ing] his bodily integrity, chemically alter[ing] his mind
and will, and usurp[ing] his fundamental right to make decisions regarding his
30. See Daniel R. Gordon, The Demise of American Constitutionalism: Death by Legal
Education, 16 S. Ill. U. L.J. 39 (1991), decrying the tendency to see all constitutional issues in terms
of federal constitutional analysis, and advocating revisions to standard constitutional law courses and
casebooks as a necessary remedy.
31. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989).
32. La. Const. an. 1, § 5, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 5. Right to Privacy
Section 5. Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy....
(emphasis added).
33. Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 414-15. This constitutional aspect of Hondroulis was discussed,
and the Court's conclusion that the state Constitution should be interpreted to include protection of
autonomy rights defended, in a previous article in this series. John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional
Law, Developments in the Law, 1989-1990, 51 La. L. Rev. 295, 297-306 (1990). As the Perry court
noted, many other state courts have likewise found that their respective state constitutions afforded
their citizens a similar right to determine the course of their own medical treatment. State v. Perry,
610 So. 2d 746, 756 (La. 1992), and cases cited therein.
34. Perry., 610 So. 2d at 755-57. The Court acknowledged that an inmate's constitutional rights
receive lessened protection and that even fundamental rights of inmates are "[slubject,to the
legitimate requirements of prison discipline and security." Id. at 757. Nonetheless, the court relied
on both federal law and the concepts of "fundamental fairness" enshrined in the Due Process clause
of the state constitution, La. Const. art. I, § 2, to conclude that inmates' state constitutional rights are
not completely extinguished by their confinement. Id. at 757 (citing Lee Hargrave, The Declaration
of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1974)).
35. Perr,, 610 So. 2d at 757-58.
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health or medical treatment."36 Applying these conclusions to the specific facts
before it, the court held that the state failed to demonstrate any compelling state
interest sufficient to outweigh what it saw as the particularly severe violation of
Perry's interests inherent in forcible administration of dangerous mind-altering
chemicals. 7
While one may argue with the conclusions that the Perry majority drew
from its application of these legal precepts to the facts of this case,38 it was
surely correct to hold that the right of "autonomy" privacy originally recognized
in Hondroulis extends to governmental invasions of an individual's body and to
governmental efforts to chemically alter a person's mind and thoughts. The
explicit guarantee of "privacy" in Section 5 of the Louisiana's 1974 Declaration
of Rights was derived from federal law. 39 Analysis of that guarantee should
begin with a determination of what that term of art meant in 1974, when it was
explicitly incorporated into the state constitution. 40  As the Court noted, both
36. Id. at 758.
37. Id. at 759-61. The court argued that the invasion of Perry's autonomy interests was
particularly egregious primarily because the drugs at issue posed a risk of severe mental and physical
side effects. Id. at 759-60. However, forcible administration of psychoactive drugs appears to
present such an Orwellian potential for abuse that it would seem to present a proper case for
exceedingly careful scrutiny in all circumstances, even absent such side effects.
The state proposed two justifications for its attempt to forcibly medicate Perry. First, it argued that
Perry's insanity made him a danger to himself and others, and that therefore forcible medication
would-like the medication approved by the federal Supreme Court in Harper-further both Perry's
own medical interests and the state's interest in prison safety. Second, the state asserted that it had
a compelling interest in medicating Perry "in order to further the social goals to be advanced by the
death penalty" itself-that is, the goals of retribution and deterrence. Id. at 761. The court rejected
both justifications; the first because it did not in fact motivate the state's decision and the second
because the court disbelieved that those goals of deterrence and retribution would in fact be
substantially furthered by the execution of a person in Perry's circumstances. Id.
38. Justice Cole, in dissent, appeared to accept the conclusion of Hondroulis that Section 5
guarantees rights of autonomy privacy, including the right of competent adults to determine the
course of their own medical treatment. He argued, however, that an incompetent is by definition
incapable of exercising such rights. Nor did Justice Cole agree that Perry was given a constitutional-
ly protected right to refuse treatment either by the fact that successful treatment would ultimately lead
to Perry's execution or the possibility of adverse side effects. Id. at 778-79 (Cole, J., dissenting).
Justice Cole did not directly discuss the other autonomy rights which the majority found to be
implicated in this case: the right to avoid physical intrusions into the body and to avoid efforts to
alter one's mind.
39. See generally John Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana State
Constitution: Could Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well in the Bayou State?, 51 La. L. Rev. 685, 689-
707 (1991), tracing the process by which the express guarantee of privacy entered the state
constitution.
40. Regardless of how one might approach the different and more difficult problem of
interpretation of the federal Constitution, the proposition that state constitutions should be interpreted
in accord with the understandings and intentions of those who drafted and ratified them is well
accepted by commentators and by courts in this state. See, e.g., L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting
State Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 Fla. St. L. Rev. 567, 569-71 (1978); Robert E.
Williams, State Constitutional Low Processes, 24 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 169, 195-201 (1983); Board
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of these additional aspects of personal autonomy had received protection under
the federal Constitution before 1974.4" Though none of the federal precedents
involved facts similar to those in Perry, the argument for inclusion is straightfor-
ward.42
Moreover, even if those federal precedents did not exist, the argument that
physical invasions of the body or attempts to alter a person's mind violate
Section 5 would still remain strong. While federal law, as it existed in 1974, is
the proper starting point for interpretation of the state constitution's privacy
guarantee, the process of interpretation should not end there. 43  The meaning
of the state constitution cannot be "frozen" in time, nor should state courts seek
to avoid their responsibility to interpret and develop the basic principles thus
incorporated into state law, or from applying those principles to new situations
as they arise."4 Even in the absence of relevant pre-1974 federal precedent, the
of Comm'rs v. Department of Natural Resources, 496 So. 2d 281 (La. 1986). On the specific issues
raised by adoption of the originally federally-developed right of privacy into state constitutions, see
John Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal Retrenchment: Some
Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived from Federal Sources, 3 Emerging Issues St.
Const. L. 195, 226-45 (1990), arguing that, where state rights are adopted from federal sources, they
should be interpreted in light of the broad general principles articulated in authoritative pre-adoption
federal decisions. Such decisions are the best evidence of what the right meant at the time of its
incorporation and thus, are the best evidence of what the framers and ratifiers of the state constitution
intended.
41. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66. 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969) (government
attempts at thought control); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952) (physical
invasion of the body).
42. Justice Marcus, in dissent, would have resolved the case along the lines set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Harper, which conceded that Perry had a "liberty interest" in
avoiding unwanted medication, but held that such an interest can be overridden whenever the state
shows a "legitimate penological interest"-such as, here, the deterrence and retribution interests
which support the death penalty in general. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 775-77 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
However, such reliance on Harper seems misplaced. The Supreme Court certainly has the power to
ignore or reinterpret its own precedents mandating heightened scrutiny of autonomy violations, as
it did in Harper. [discuss Harper dissent and commentaries] However, such post-incorporation
vacillations in federal interpretation of federal rights provide little reason for state courts to vary
interpretation of the state constitution. The starting place for interpretation of Section 5 should
remain Hondroulis and Perry placed it-that is, the concept of constitutional privacy as it was
interpreted at the time it was written into fundamental Louisiana law.
See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text, discussing the problems inherent in efforts to
interpret state constitutional guarantees in "lockstep" with changing interpretations of analogous
federal rights.
43. Justice Dennis made precisely this point a little later in his majority opinion in Perry, in
discussing the alternative ground for the court's holding in Perry: the state constitution's guarantee
of "humane treatment." La. Const. art. 1, § 20. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 762.
44. Interpretations that would limit the state privacy guarantee to only those specific
circumstances to which the implicit privacy guarantee of the United States Constitution had been
applied before 1974 may have some attraction for those who wish to limit state rights in general.
Nevertheless, the arguments against such an approach are significant. First, as to many difficult
issues, it is by no means self-evident what pre-1974 federal law was. Such an approach would also
exact a high cost in loss of adaptability, depriving state courts of their traditional function of adapting
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right to be free from government acts physically invading the body or attempting
to influence one's thoughts seems proper for inclusion in any fully articulated
concept of personal privacy and autonomy.
Finally, it should be noted that the strong autonomy-based right to refuse
psychoactive drugs found in Perry will likely have a significant impact in
contexts far removed from the specific facts of that case. It appears, for
example, that Perry may require prison officials to demonstrate a higher degree
of justification before they may forcibly medicate ordinary inmates (those not on
death row), than would be required under federal law as interpreted in Harper.45
Other issues that may arise include whether the state may force psychoactive
medicine on a person accused of a crime, in order to render him mentally
competent to stand trial,46 and whether civilly committed psychiatric patients
may invoke a similar right to refuse psychoactive drugs.47 These issues, and
others, remain unresolved in Perry's wake.
the constitution to changing historical circumstances. Finally, as many scholars have noted,
federalism constraints and other institutional reasons often result in systematic "underenforcement"
of federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the
Strategic Space Between the Norns and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959 (1985);
Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. Rev. 353 (1984). Any theory of interpretation that would
require state courts to strictly adhere to federal interpretation of cognate provisions would thus
prevent the state court from taking these differences into account in any meaningful way. See
generally Devlin, supra note 40, at 237-42.
45. The majority opinion in Perry did not reject all possibility of a medical justification for
forced medication of inmates. Rather, the Court found only that justifications of that type were not
really at issue in Perry's case. Perry, 610 So. 2d 761. However, Perry's insistence that the state
may not compel inmates to take psychotropic medication unless it shows a "compelling interest,"
does appear to require a greater showing of need than the federal Supreme Court required in Harper,
which held any "legitimate penological interest" sufficient. Id. at 781-82 (Cole, I., dissenting) (noting
the limits of the Court's holding).
46. As Justice Marcus pointed out in his dissent, the requirement that a criminal defendant have
the mental capacity to undergo trial has been defined as requiring that he have the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him and to assist counsel. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 774 (Marcus, J.,
dissenting) (citing State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129 (La. 1977)). Although these requirements seem
significantly more rigorous than the requirements for mental capacity to undergo execution, any
analysis of how Perry will apply to mentally incompetent defendants who refuse medication will
require a similar balancing of state versus individual interests. Courts will have to consider such
issues as the extent of the violation of autonomy in the particular case (including such sub-issues as
whether medication can be justified, in part, as being in the defendant's own medical interest and the
nature and extent of possible side effects) and whether the state's interest in trying such a defendant
is sufficient to outweigh his fight to refuse treatment.
47. A similar analysis would apply in these circumstances as well. See generally Catherine E.
Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to Rot" Collide: The Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. Rev. 447 (1990); Dennis E. Cichon, The Right
to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 La. L. Rev.
283 (1992).
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3. The Right to Humane Treatment
The alternative basis for the court's holding in Perry was its conclusion that
the combination of forcing psychotropic drugs on Perry and then executing him
violated the guarantee of "humane treatment" of the Louisiana Declaration of
Rights.48 The court began its analysis with an extensive restatement of the
philosophical and legal underpinnings of the state constitution's prohibitions
against cruel, excessive and unusual punishments. The court identified one major
principle-that punishments must not degrade the human dignity of those on
whom they are inflicted-and three subsidiary principles-that punishments may
not be arbitrarily inflicted, excessive, or unacceptable to modem society-as
guides for interpretation of that right.49 Applying these principles to the facts
before it, the majority concluded: that forcing medication on Perry for the sole
purpose of procuring his execution violated basic principles of human dignity by
treating him as a mere vessel for his own demise, rather than as an autonomous
being; that the unusual circumstances presented in this case rendered the sentence
arbitrary; that the penalty is excessive both because forcible administration of
antipsychotic drugs would cause Perry to suffer more than sane individuals who
are simply executed, and because his death is not necessary to further social
goals of retribution and deterrence; and that the penalty, in this case, violated
general standards of medical ethics and penological practice.50
Reasonable minds can differ as to some or all of the majority's specific
conclusions in its application of these principles to Perry's case.51 Nonetheless,
the court's exegesis of the principles underlying Section 20 remains important
and should serve as the starting place for future analyses of these issues.
B. State v. Tucker: Of Drugs, Seizures, and the Siren Call of Federal
Precedent
The Louisiana Supreme Court's commitment to the principles of indepen-
dent interpretation of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights, announced in Perry,
did not long survive that opinion, at least in any pure form. Within only a few
months thereafter, the court handed down State v. Tucker, 2 an opinion in
which Justice Kimball, speaking for a bare majority of the court, appeared to
take a very different view of the persuasiveness of federal construction of federal
48. La. Const. art. I, § 20 provides as follows:
Section 20. Right to Humane Treatment
Section 20. No law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel,
excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall be restored upon
termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for any offense.
49. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 762-65.
50. Id. at 765-71.
.51. See, e.g., id. at 779-81 (Cole, J., dissenting).
52. 619 So. 2d 38, superceded by, 626 So. 2d 707 (La.), affd, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993).
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rights for interpretation of cognate provisions of the Louisiana Declaration of
Rights.
In March 1990, approximately twenty-five local and Louisiana State police
officers conducted a coordinated drug sweep of an area of downtown Shreveport.
During that sweep, two officers observed Tucker and another person standing
together. When the two individuals saw the police approaching, they separated
and began to leave the scene. The two officers approached to within several feet
of the two men and ordered them to "halt" and "prone out." Tucker's
companion complied immediately. Tucker took a few more steps, tossed away
a plastic bag, and then complied. The plastic bag was recovered and found to
contain forty-seven marijuana cigarettes. Tucker was arrested and subsequently
convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.53 The
Court of Appeals reversed Tucker's conviction, holding that the police officers'
order to Tucker that he "halt" and "prone out" constituted a "seizure" because
the officers had "display[ed] a show of authority which would cause a reasonable
person to believe that detention [was] imminent, regardless of whether physical
force ha[d] been applied to the person or whether he ha[d] submitted to a show
of authority." 4 Since the court also held that the police lacked any reasonable
articulable suspicion of Tucker sufficient to justify that seizure under Section 5
of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights, it concluded that the marijuana was
therefore inadmissible in evidence as fruits of an illegal arrest." The Louisiana
Supreme Court granted the state's application for a writ and, on review,
reinstated Tucker's conviction. In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme
court did not dispute that the police lacked sufficient grounds to seize Tucker,
or that fruits of an illegal seizure are inadmissible at trial. Rather, it disagreed
solely on the question of whether Tucker had in fact been "seized" at the time
he tossed away the bag containing the marijuana.
Before 1991, both the federal and state constitutions were construed to
mean that an individual was "seized" under the meaning of their respective
guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure 6 whenever police had,
through a display of authority, acted so as to lead a reasonable person to
conclude that he was about to be detained and was thus not "free to walk
away"-a standard that applied regardless of whether or not the individual
actually submitted to that show of authority." In California v. Hodari
53. Id. at 40-41.
54. State v. Tucker, 604 So. 2d 600, 608 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 608-09.
56. U.S. Const. amend. IV; La. Const. art. 1, § 5, quoted, in part, supra at note 32.
57. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980) (seizure occurs when "a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877
(1968) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections are implicated "whenever a police officer accosts
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"); State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S. Ct. 2158 (1984) (holding that a person is seized when he
reasonably believes himself no longer "free to disregard the encounter and walk away"); State v.
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D.,55 the United States Supreme Court changed this prior understanding with
respect to federal law, holding that a "seizure" under the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment does not occur until the arresting officer has applied "physical
force" to the suspect, or the suspect has "submitted to the assertion of authori-
ty.'
59
In Tucker, the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged that the protection
of privacy guaranteed by Section 5 of the state Declaration of Rights goes
beyond the cognate protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, and that
Hodari D. did not necessarily control interpretation of that state constitutional
provision.6° The court in Tucker chose to adopt the federal Court's novel
analysis in Hodari D. as correctly identifying "when, during a police encounter,
an individual has been 'actually stopped"' under the meaning of the state
constitution as well.6' Section 5 was held to provide additional protections,
beyond those given by the newly constricted Fourth Amendment, only insofar as
Section 5 also applies to seizures which are "imminent" or "virtually certain" to
occur, but have not yet ripened into an "actual stop."62  Applying these
Chopin, 372 So. 2d 1222, 1224-25 (La. 1979) (holding that "detention was imminent" and that
constitutional protections attached when police swung their car into a suspect's path and stopped a
few feet away); State v. Patterson, 588 So. 2d 392, 395-96 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (privacy may
be invaded regardless of whether the suspect submits to the police officers' show of authority). Only
weeks before Tucker, a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court had held that an investigatory stop
constituted a seizure, for purposes of both state and federal law, because "a reasonable person would
think he was not free to leave" under the circumstances presented. State v. Moreno, 619 So. 2d 62,
67 (La. 1993) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980)).
58. 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
59. Id. The Supreme Court's alteration of prior law in Hodari D. and in a companion case,
Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991), has been the subject of severe academic criticism. See,
e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology and the Deconstitutionalization of Criminal Procedure,
95 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 18-26 (1992); Hon. Constance Baker Motley, Civil Rights-Civil Liberties in the
U.S. Supreme Court-Are the State Courts Our Only Hope?, 9 Harv. BlackLetter J. 101, 103-04
(1992); Patrick T. Costello, Casenote, California v. Hodari D.: The Demise of the Reasonable Person
Test in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 12 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 463 (1992); Randolph Alexander
Piedrahita, Note, A Conserv'ative Court Says "Goodbye to All That" and Forges a New Order in the
Law of Seizure-California v. Hodari D., 52 La. L. Rev. 1321 (1992); James F. Heuerman, Note,
Florida v. Bostick: Abandonment of Reason in Fourth Amendment Reasonable Person Analysis, 13
N. 11. U. L. Rev. 173 (1992); Michael J. Reed, Jr., Comment, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth
Amendment Takes a Back Seat to the Drug War, 27 N. Eng. L. Rev. 825 (1993).
60. 619 So. 2d 38, 43, superceded by, 626 So. 2d 707, 711-12 (La.), aftd, 626 So. 2d 720
(1993).
61. Id. Chief Justice Calogero and Justices Dennis and Ortique each wrote dissents, and Justice
Marcus concurred.
62. Id. at 712-13. The Court articulated a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in
determining whether an actual stop is "virtually certain":
(1) the proximity of the police in relation to the defendant at the outset of the encounter;
(2) whether the individual has been surrounded by the police; (3) whether the police
approached the individual with their weapons drawn; (4) whether the police and/or the
individual are on foot or in motorized vehicles during the encounter; (5) the location and
characteristics of the area where the encounter takes place; and (6) the number of police
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standards, the court found that Tucker had not yet been actually stopped, and that
arrest was not yet imminent or virtually certain to occur, at the time he discarded
the contraband. It concluded that the bag was abandoned property, not the fruit
of an improper seizure, and that the bag need not be excluded from evidence.63
Tucker may be subject to critique on several substantive grounds,(
including that it substantially changed the prior law of this state by allowing
police to rely on the fiction of "abandonment" to obtain evidence as a direct
result of an investigatory stop that concededly was not supported by sufficient
cause.65  However, the most fundamental problem inheres in the Tucker
majority's methodological approach to interpreting the state constitution. As was
noted above, analysis of constitutional terms should at least begin with
consideration of what the relevant language meant to those who drafted and
ratified that language, at the time they acted.' 6 "Seizure," like "privacy," is a
constitutional term of art. Thus, analysis of the meaning of that term should at
least begin with an inquiry into its meaning as a term of art in 1974.67 As
officers involved in the encounter.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
63. Id.
64. For example, scholars have argued that Hodari D. itself is simply wrong as a matter of
logic and of federal law. See, e.g., Ashdown, supra note 59; Costello, supra note 59; Piedrahita,
supra note 59. If so, the Tucker Court's reliance on the wisdom of Hodari D. may be misplaced.
Alternatively, as Chief Justice Calogero pointed out in his dissent, even under the majority's novel
construction of § 5, Tucker may well have been in a situation of "imminent" seizure at the time he
disposed of the bag of marijuana. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 715-16 (La.), affd, 626 So. 2d 720
(1993) (Calogero, C.J., dissenting). Unlike the situation in Hodari D., Tucker was not in full flight
at the time he threw away the bag; rather, he took only a few steps before complying with the order
that he "prone out." He was accosted during a coordinated sweep involving many officers.
Moreover, the armed officers who ordered him to halt were only a few feet away and were very
capable of enforcing that order by force, if necessary. Even according to Justice Kimball's analysis,
one could easily argue that his seizure was both "virtually certain" and "imminent" and that the
protections of § 5 therefore attached.
65. For prior law precluding Louisiana police from reaping this evidentiary benefit from an
illegal stop, see, e.g., State v. Smith, 347 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (La. 1977) (citations omitted):
If ... officers do not have the right to make an investigatory stop, evidence seized or
otherwise obtained as a result thereof cannot constitutionally be admitted into evidence
against a criminally accused .... This inadmissibility extends to property dropped or
abandoned in response to an illegal stop.
See also State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869 (La. 1974); State v. Lawson, 256 La. 471, 236 So. 2d 804
(1970). As the Louisiana Supreme Court later described it, "the foundation of Saia is the proposition
that police officers may not reap the benefits of their unlawful intrusion into the citizen's freedom
of movement." State v. Ryan, 358 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (La. 1978). See generally Eulis Simien,
Criminal Law and Procedure: 1991-92 in Review, 53 La. L. Rev. 771, 778 (1993), noting the
inconsistency between Hodari D. and prior Louisiana law.
66. See discussion supra at notes 40-44.
67. See, e.g., American Lung Ass'n v. State Mineral Bd., 507 So. 2d 184, 189 (La. 1987),
treating the word "sold" as used in the alienation of mineral rights section of the state constitution,
La. Const. art. IX, § 4, as a "term of art" that must be construed in accordance with its accepted
technical meaning at the time the state constitution was adopted.
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Justice Dennis pointed out in his strongly worded dissent, earlier federal
decisions and state statutory enactments had both, by 1974, provided a gloss on
the meaning of "seizure" as a term of constitutional discourse-a gloss which
would have given an objective but knowledgeable framer or ratifier good reason
to understand that neither actual arrest nor submission to police authority would
be necessary for a court to find that a "seizure" had occurred.68
It may be that this analysis is not conclusive and that contrary evidence of
the meaning of constitutional "seizure" in 1974 could have been adduced. But,
the majority made no inquiry into what the term might have been understood to
mean in 1974, either as a term of art or otherwise.
Instead of looking to the understanding of 1974, the majority's argument in
favor of adopting the narrow Hodari D. definition of "seizure" into Louisiana
law appears to have rested solely on two grounds: its perception that the
constitutional protections of privacy were outweighed by the seriousness of the
drug problem in the state6 9 and its conclusion that the acknowledged desire of
the drafters and ratifiers of the state constitution for heightened privacy
protection could be satisfied by doing no more than continuing prior caselaw to
the effect that the state guarantee, unlike its federal counterpart, applies to
"imminent" seizures that are "virtually certain" to occur, 70  However, in the
absence of any convincing derivation of these new principles from Louisiana
sources-either from the debates surrounding the drafting or ratification of the
1974 constitution, from some well established body of Louisiana caselaw,7" or
some unique factor of Louisiana culture or history-the court remains vulnerable
to charges that its analysis reflects no more than a substitution of the court's own
68. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 716-17 (La.), affd, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993) (Dennis, J., dissenting)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.
Ct. 507 (1967): and La. Code Crim. P. art. 215.1(A), which was enacted in 1968 in order to adopt
the analysis of Terry into state law).
69. Id. at 711.
70. Id. at 712. See also id. at 719 (Dennis, J., dissenting), arguing that extending protection
to "imminent" arrests that are "virtually certain to occur" will make little real world difference.
71. The majority did cite one Louisiana case, State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S. Ct. 2158 (1984), for the proposition that the Louisiana constitution
protects suspects in situations of "imminent," as well as actual detention. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707,
712 (La.), aff'd, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993). However, Tucker's important holding was not that
"imminent" seizures are covered by § 5, but rather that this additional protection is essentially the
only difference between state and recently-narrowed federal law regarding when search and seizure
protections attach. For this latter point, that the expansive effect of § 5 in this area goes no farther
than this single distinction, the Tucker majority cited nothing.
The only other Louisiana case on which the majority heavily relied was State v. Ryan, 358 So. 2d
1274 (La. 1978), which was cited for the unexceptional proposition that contraband abandoned by
a suspect can be retrieved and used in evidence against him. However, the facts of Ryan were
crucially different than those in Tucker. In Ryan, there was no illegal "stop" of the suspect; the
property was abandoned before the police made any effort to intrude upon the suspect's freedom of
movement. In Tucker, there was apparently no question that the officers accosted the suspect without
sufficient grounds to do so; the property was abandoned only as a result of that intrusion.
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policy concerns for the understandings of those who wrote and adopted the state
constitution," or an uncritical adoption of federal precedent,7 3 or both.
72. The Tucker majority opinion was admirably candid in its explanation of the policy grounds
that led it to adopt the Hodari D. analysis of when an actual "seizure" has taken place:
[i]mplicit in the Hodari D. Court's break from its prior jurisprudence ... is the Court's
recognition of the severe problem with drug-related criminal conduct in America today.
We too recognize the existence of this problem in our State. It is with this problem in
mind that we address the balance of interests embodied in the rights against "unreason-
able" searches and seizures protected by our constitution.
Like the Hodari D. Court, we do not believe the constitutional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures were intended to shield the criminal activities of those
involved with use and distribution of illicit drugs; particularly the typical situation which
we frequently see in which drugs are "thrown down" in an attempt to evade police
detection .... Thus, cognizant of the drug-related criminal problem in our State, we must
today determine first whether our constitution would allow us to adopt Hodari D....
Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 711 (La.), aff'd, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993) (citation omitted).
In arguing that application of traditional "search and seizure" protections to drug suspects would
be bad policy for the state, the Tucker majority faithfully echoed the policy choices underlying
Hodari D. But the question remains whether such policy arguments are an appropriate basis for
constitutional decisionmaking. I have previously argued that policy arguments of this type may be
appropriate When the court must decide issues which the framers and ratifiers clearly did not consider.
See John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments in the Law 1986-87, 48 La. L. Rev.
335, 353-54 (1987). However, as the Court has recognized on other occasions, the framers of the
'Louisiana Constitution of 1974 intended to expand, not contract, protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Thus, it may be difficult to show that the issues presented in Tucker really
constitute questions that the convention and ratifiers failed to consider. Moreover, even if this were
an unconsidered case, reliance on policy arguments alone may be an insecure basis for constitutional
interpretation. Judicial activism in pursuit of politically conservative goals is no less "activist"-or
suspect-than its liberal twin.
73. State constitutional rights guarantees can be written to expand and contract in "lockstep"
with the vagaries of federal court interpretation of analogous federal rights. Florida, for example, has
done so, amending its state constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to
explicitly provide that the rights it grants must be "construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment
to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court," and that
evidence obtained in violation of the state guarantee shall only be suppressed "if such articles or
information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing
the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution." Fla. Const. art. I, § 12 (1983). This
amendment has been the subject of considerable controversy. Compare, e.g., John C. Cooper,
Beyond the Federal Constitution: The Status of Constitutional Law in Florida, 18 Stetson L. Rev.
241 (1989) (defending the amendment as a proper exercise of power by the people of the state), with
Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's "Forced
Linkage" Amendment, 39 Fla. L. Rev. 653 (1987) (arguing that the amendment derogates from the
proper role of the state courts and should be narrowly construed). Florida courts have broadly
construed the amendment to make sure all evidence admissible under federal law is admissible in that
state. See, e.g., Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 991 (Fla. 1988) (following post-adoption changes
in federal law); State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1987) (rejecting the argument that other state
constitutional provisions justified exclusion of evidence not excludable under § 12).
However, the Louisiana guarantee of privacy is not so limited. On the contrary, as the Tucker
majority acknowledged, those who drafted and ratified the 1974 Constitution intended to assure
themselves a degree of privacy protection greater than was available under federal law at that time.
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This does not mean federal decisions are without persuasive impact, or that
the majority could not have reached the same conclusions through an analysis of
Louisiana Constitutional sources. But by taking the easier path of simply
adopting a federal analysis that it happened to find congenial, rather than basing
its argument firmly and squarely on any Louisiana tradition, the majority both
weakened the persuasive force of its opinion and created an unfortunate
interpretive precedent.
C. Short Takes
In other cases, Louisiana courts have issued a number of noteworthy
decisions regarding the state constitutional law of criminal procedure. With
respect to a criminal defendant's "right to counsel,"74 courts held that an
individual accused of speeding must be informed of his right to be represented
by counsel,7 5 but reaffirmed that the right is in the alternative-that, on appeal,
a convicted defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel or to represent
himself, but not both.76
Criminal defendants' state constitutional right to trial by jury77 has also
Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 711-12 (La.), affi, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993). A fortiori, § 5 should be
interpreted to provide a much greater level of protection than is available under the significantly
narrowed interpretations of federal law applied by the federal courts today. Thus, recent federal
decisions significantly narrowing federal rights protections are particularly suspect as sources for
interpretation of the state constitution.
74. La. Const. art. I, § 13, provides, in pertinent part, that "[alt each stage of the proceedings,
every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice, or appointed by the court if he is
indigent and charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment."
75. State v. Fraychineaud, 620 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993). The fifth circuit construed
§ 13 of the state constitution and Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 513 to require that a
defendant charged with speeding must be informed of his right to counsel. The constitutional right
to counsel attaches whenever, as here, an offense is potentially punishable by even a short term of
imprisonment. The criminal code requires that any defendant subject to imprisonment be informed
of his right to appointed counsel if he is indigent-and thus, implicitly of his right to counsel
simpliciter-before he pleads. Thus, the trial court's failure to inform the defendant of these rights
was reversible error.
76. In State v. Gene. 587 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) and State v. Hughes, 587 So. 2d
31 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991), the second circuit declined to consider points raised in supplemental pro
se briefs filed by criminal defendants, in part because each of those defendants was simultaneously
represented by counsel. While there is little novelty in the rule that a defendant has the right to be
represented by counsel or to represent himself, but not both, previous cases were decided on the basis
of the United States Constitution and the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. These appear to
be the first cases that have construed § 13 of the state Declaration of Rights in similar fashion.
77. La. Const. art. I., § 17, provides as follows:
Section 17. Jury Trial in Criminal Cases
Section 17. A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before
a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case in which
the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried before a jury of
twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the
punishment may be confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more
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produced appellate decisions, including cases construing the requirements for
knowing and intelligent waiver of that right, 78 strictly construing constitutional
mandates regarding the size of juries for particular offenses,79 preventing trial
judges from arbitrarily limiting defense counsel's opportunity to conduct
extensive voir dire of potential jurors, 0 and precluding defense counsel from
exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.81
than six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, five of whom must concur to
render a verdict. The accused shall have the right to full voir dire examination of
prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily. The number of challenges shall
be fixed by law. Except in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently
waive his fight to a trial by jury.
78. In State v. Owens, 596 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 678 (1992),
the court considered a case in which a defendant's waiver of a jury on retrial was induced by false
statements by his own attorney that his sentence would be reduced if he waived his right to a jury.
The court held that, under such circumstances, the waiver was not "knowing and intelligent" and that
the conviction be reversed. Id. at 832.
79. In State v. Clark, 589 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1992), the first circuit strictly construed
the requirements La. Const. art I, § 17, regarding the size of a criminal jury. It held that where a
defendant is charged with both a crime that must be tried before a twelve-person jury and a crime
that must be tried before a six person jury, the two cannot be jointly tried before a single twelve-
person jury. If such error is made, the verdict of the wrong-sized jury is null, but the other verdict
will be reversed only if the defendant shows he was actually prejudiced by the joint trial. Id. at 553.
This follows the court's prior decision in State v. King, 524 So. 2d 1376 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
80. State v. Hall, 616 So. 2d 664 (La. 1993), reversing defendant's conviction because the trial
judge had prevented defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors in detail as to their
understanding of and ability to apply nuances in the law. Blanket statements by jurors that they
would follow the law as given by the judge were found to be insufficient to satisfy the constitutional
requirement, especially since, in Hall, few facts were in dispute and the case turned on "complex"
issues of law and application of law to fact. The legal points which the Court found to be crucial
included whether the defendant's acts constituted murder or manslaughter, whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the elements of first degree murder, and how concepts of "reasonable
doubt" would apply. While these issues may have been "complex," they are certainly not unusual.
It appears that the court's ruling in favor of expansive voir dire would apply to many, if not most,
criminal prosecutions.
See also State v. Strange. 619 So. 2d 817 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), holding that a trial court's
arbitrary limitation of defense counsel's voir dire to ten minutes constituted error requiring reversal
of defendant's conviction. Id. at 820-21. The court drew upon a prior case, State v. Jones, 596 So.
2d 1360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), in which the circuit had announced the principle that arbitrary
preset time limits on voir dire presumptively violate § 17 of the state Declaration of Rights, but had
found the error harmless on the precise facts of the case.
81. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 172 (1986), the Court held that the
Constitution precluded prosecutors from using peremptory challenges in racially biased manner. In
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), the Court held that the Constitution also precluded
a white criminal defendant from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially biased way so as to
exclude blacks from the jury that would decide his case.
In State v. Knox, 609 So. 2d 803 (La. 1992), the Louisiana Supreme Court applied these recent
federal decisions to hold that the McCollum rule also applied in the reverse situation, where black
defendants used peremptory challenges to exclude whites from their juries. The decision in Knox is
correct as a statement of current and binding federal law. As the Knox court noted, the United States
Supreme Court has remanded a case involving a black defendant for reconsideration in light of
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Louisiana and federal guarantees of procedural fairness at trial 2 have also
been salient, with courts holding that trial judges may not arbitrarily limit the
length of a defendant's closing argument, 83 that compelling a criminal defendant
to appear at trial in prison garb is not "harmless error," 4 that interpreters must
McCollum. Georgia v. Carr, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). While this remand may not be dispositive in
itself, cases involving racial classifications in other contexts make it clear that all state actions
classifying on the basis of race must be justified according to the same "strict scrutiny" standard,
regardless of whether those disadvantaged thereby are white or black. See, e.g., City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). There is little reason to suspect that, absent
extraordinary circumstances, the federal Supreme Court would reach a different result in a case like
Knox or Carr.
However, the most instructive aspect of the case may be the concurring opinions which express
their substantive disagreement with the result reached by the McCollum Court. As they point out,
should the federal courts recede from the rule of McCollum, sound arguments could be made that the
Louisiana Constitution would support a different result-one that would recognize that criminal
defendants have more freedom than do criminal prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges in a
racially conscious manner. Knox, 609 So. 2d at 807-08 (Calogero, C.J., joined by Watson, J.,
concurring); Id. at 808-09 (Lemmon, J., concurring). As Chief Justice Calogero pointed out,
Louisiana law makes relevant distinctions between criminal prosecutors and criminal defendants. For
example, while a criminal defendant's right to peremptory challenges is established by the
constitution, La. Const. art. I, § 17, a prosecutor's power to exercise such challenges is merely
statutory in origin.
Moreover, there is no necessary reason to believe that the requirement of "state action" would be
drawn the same way under the state constitution as it has been drawn under the federal constitution.
Thus, a state supreme court would be free to conclude that, according to the state constitution,
criminal defense attorneys are not "state actors" who are required to abide by constitutional norms.
Cf. Kevin Cole, Federal and State "State Action ": The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized
Doctrine, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 327 (1990) (arguing that the concept of "state action" should be construed
more broadly under state constitutions than under the federal Constitution); John Devlin, Constructing
an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey,
Critique and Proposal, 21 Rutgers L.J. 819 (1990); Jennifer Friesen, Should California's
Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Actors?, 17 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 111 (1990).
82. La. Const. art. I, § 16, provides as follows:
Section 16. Right to a Fair Trial
Section 16. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty
and is entitled to a speedy, public, and impartial trial in the parish where the offense or
an element of the offense occurred, unless venue is changed in accordance with law. No
person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself. An accused is entitled to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to compel the attendance of
witnesses, to present a defense, and to testify on his own behalf.
83. State v. Washington, 614 So. 2d 711 (La. 1993), holding that the trial judge had abused his
discretion by arbitrarily limiting defense counsel to fifteen minutes to present his closing arguments.
84. State v. Brown; 585 So. 2d 1211 (La. 1991). The practice of compelling a criminal
defendant to appear at trial while dressed in identifiable prison garb has long been held to violate the
state constitution's guarantee of fair criminal procedure. Brown moved beyond that prior law by
squarely holding that such a violation did not constitute "harmless error," despite the trial judge's
admonition to the jury that it should attach no significance to those clothes. In so doing, the court
purported to apply the new approach to harmless error analysis set out by the United States Supreme
Court in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 2067
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be appointed to assist hearing-impaired criminal defendants, 5 and that revoca-
tion of probation on the basis of post-release criminal conduct requires actual
proof that the parolee committed those alleged crimes.8 6
The substantive Louisiana constitutional rights of privacy and equal
treatment have also required consideration in the criminal law context. In State
v. Pierre,8 7 the Third Circuit held that the state constitutional guarantee of
individual privacy8 did not prevent a court from ordering a defendant who was
indicted on rape charges to submit to DNA testing, in order to determine the
probability that he was the father of a child born as a result of that rape. 89 The
court also held that no separate "probable cause" hearing was required before the
testing could be ordered; existing criminal procedural protections, notably
including the fact of indictment, adequately demonstrate the requisite probable
cause.' In other cases, circuit courts held that neither Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:80(A)(1), which defines criminal carnal knowledge of a juvenile so
as to make the prohibition apply only to males, nor Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:981.3, which enhances punishments for drug offenses committed within 1,000
feet of school property, violates the state constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.
91
(1991). It would be more consistent with the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the state
constitution if the courts were to apply pre-Fulninante "harmless error" analysis to violations of the
state constitution. See John Devlin & David Hilbum, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments
in the Law, 1990.1991, 52 La. L. Rev. 575, 600-01 (1992). Nonetheless, it appears that either
analytic approach would lead to the same result in this case.
Compare State v. Claxton, 603 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), reiterating that a system of
assigning judges for criminal trials which effectively permitted prosecutors to choose the judge that
would preside violated defendants' due process rights, but holding that, where no actual bias was
evident, the error was "harmless."
85. See, e.g., State v. Barber, 617 So. 2d 974 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (finding that the
defendant was handicapped in assisting in his defense, despite his statements that he could read lips);
State v. Decuire, 602 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (hearing-impaired defendant entitled to new
trial even though the handicap was not brought to the trial court's attention until sentencing).
86. State v. Dabney, 594 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992). In Dabney, the parolee's release
was revoked solely on the basis of testimony that he had been arrested for certain alleged offenses.
Though the issue was not raised on appeal, the Fifth Circuit held, sua sponte, that parole revocation
on these grounds requires proof that the parolee either had been convicted of or had committed the
alleged offenses.
87. 606 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
88. La. Const. art. I, § 5, quoted in part supra at note 32.
89. Pierre, 606 So. 2d at 818.
90. Id. at 818-21.
91. State v. Vining, 609 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (upholding carnal knowledge of
a juvenile statute); State v. Brown, 606 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992) (upholding enhanced
drug penalties). Interestingly, in reaching their conclusions, both cases relied on federal and pre-1985
state precedent. Neither cited Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985), the
Louisiana Supreme Court's leading opinion on interpretation of the Louisiana equality guarantee, La.
Const. art. I, § 3, quoted infra at note 129. See discussion infra at note 131.
[Vol. 54
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir: 92 Of Filiation, Privacy, and State
Action
Paul Hoffpauir died intestate, survived by his widow, an adopted son and a
daughter, Rosemary Hoffpauir Schuh. While his estate was still in administra-
tion, plaintiff Alana Sudwischer sued to establish filiation, contending that the
deceased was her natural father and that therefore she too was entitled to a
portion of the estate.93 By Louisiana law, she was required to establish her
claim by "clear and convincing evidence." '94 Sudwischer sought to meet this
standard and prove filiation through several lines of evidence, including
comparative DNA tests.9 Since the alleged biological father was deceased (and
92. 589 So. 2d 474 (La. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992).
93. The Equal Protection clause of the federal Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, has been
construed to require that, unless other good reasons supervene, an illegitimate who can prove filiation
is entitled to be treated equally with legitimate siblings. The cases are legion. See, e.g., Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983) (illegitimate children must be treated equally with
legitimate children in relation to the reception of child support); Trimble v. Gordon 430 U.S. 762,
97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977) (statute precluding unacknowledged illegitimate from becoming intestate heir
of her father struck down); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973) (statute requiring
a man to support his legitimate but not illegitimate children was struck down); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400 (1972) (the definition of the word "children" in
the Louisiana workman's compensation laws was found unconstitutional in that it included only
legitimate children, stepchildren, legitimate posthumous children, and acknowledged illegitimate
children); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968) (laws must permit illegitimate
children to sue for the wrongful death of their mother).
The equality provision of the Louisiana constitution, La. Const. art. I, § 3, expressly provides that
no law may arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of "birth,"
a term which was intended to and has been construed to prohibit discrimination against illegitimates.
See, e.g., Succession of Bartie, 472 So. 2d 578 (La. 1985) (striking down so much of state forced
heirship laws as excluded illegitimate children); Jordan v. Cosey, 434 So. 2d 386 (La. 1983) (Civil
Code article limiting amount of a donation by a father to an illegitimate child to 1/4 of the father's
property, if the father was survived by legitimate descendants or siblings, held unconstitutional);
Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Brown, 450 U.S.
998, 101 S. Ct. 1703 (1981) (Civil Code article providing that acknowledged illegitimates could not
come to intestate successions if the deceased parent was survived by legitimate descendants held
unconstitutional); Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979) (Code article excluding
illegitimate children from receiving the mother's legacy if legitimate were in existence held
unconstitutional).
94. "A child not entitled to legitimate filiation nor filiated by the initiative of the parent by
legitimation or acknowledgment under Article 203 must prove filiation as to an alleged deceased
parent by clear and convincing evidence in a civil proceeding instituted by the child or on his
behalf .. " La. Civ. Code art. 209(B).
95. Sudwischer also proffered testimony that the deceased recognized her as his daughter during
his lifetime, but the Supreme Court noted that scientific testing would be useful to corroborate this
-evidence. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 475. As the court noted, it is undisputed that scientific tests
comparing the DNA characteristics of blood samples are highly accurate and useful means of
establishing or disproving biological relationships among people. Id., and authorities cited.
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his blood was therefore unavailable for testing), Sudwischer sought a judicial
order compelling the deceased's only surviving blood relative, Schuh, to submit
to the drawing of a small blood sample for use in that DNA test. Schuh resisted,
asserting that her constitutionally protected right of privacy would be violated if
she were compelled to submit to the blood test.9 The trial court denied
Sudwischer's motion to compel Schuh to submit to blood testing, without
reaching the constitutional issues.97
In Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir,98 the Supreme Court reversed,
acknowledging that the test infringed on Schuh's constitutionally protected
privacy interests, but holding that Sudwischer "has a constitutional right to prove
filiation to a deceased father" which, under the circumstances, outweighed
Schuh's privacy interest. 9  Justice Dennis dissented, arguing that while the
96. The right to be free from unjustifiable government intrusions into one's body-whether in
the form of unwanted medical treatment or, as here, court ordered sampling of bodily fluids-has
been held to be protected by both the federal Constitution and the Louisiana constitution. Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (right to refuse medical
treatment and countervailing state interests both recognized); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So.
2d 398, 414-15 (La. 1989) (construing La. Const. art. I, § 5, quoted supra at note 32). The privacy
right does not, however, always prevail over countervailing interests. See, e.g., State v. Pierre, 606
So. 2d 816 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 607 So. 2d 568 (La. 1992) holding that state
constitutional guarantee of privacy did not prevent a court from ordering a defendant who was
indicted on rape charges to submit to DNA testing in order to determine the probability that he was
the father of a child born as a result of that rape).
97. The trial court never reached the constitutional issues raised in this case, holding instead
that La. R.S. 9:396-which specifically provides for court-ordered DNA testing of blood samples,
when necessary to resolve issues of paternity-does not authorize blood tests of siblings.
Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 474.
La. R.S. 9:396(A) (1990) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, in any civil action in
which paternity is a relevant fact ... the court ... shall order the mother, child, and
alleged father to submit to the drawing of blood samples and shall direct that inherited
characteristics in the samples, including but not limited to blood and tissue type, be
determined by appropriate testing procedures. If any party refuses to submit to such tests,
the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce its order if
the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
Justice Cole agreed with the trial court and argued, in dissent, that since the statute authorizes blood
tests only of the alleged illegitimate, the alleged biological father, and the mother, but does not
specifically authorize blood tests of alleged siblings, the court was without statutory authority to order
the tests in this case. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 479. The majority opinion and Justice Lemmon,
concurring, argued that the statute should not be read as exclusive and that the statute does not
purport to limit the authority that the judge would have under ordinary discovery principles to order
blood tests in appropriate cases. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 474-77 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
98. 589 So. 2d 474. For a thorough discussion of the statutory and policy issues raised by this
case, see J.E. Cullens, Jr., Note, Should the Legitimate Child be Forced to Pay for the Sins of Her
Father?: Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 53 La. L. Rev. 1675 (1993).
99. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 476. In performing the balance, the court characterized
Sudwischer's interests as substantial: "She [Sudwischer] has an overriding emotional and financial
interest in knowing her father's identity." Schuh's interests, in contrast, were characterized as being
only minimally infringed: "[Schuh] has asserted no physical or religious obstacles to a blood test.
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right to privacy is fundamental and substantive, there is no countervailing
substantive "right to prove filiation" per se. Rather, he argued, the right of
illegitimates recognized in prior federal and state cases is more limited,
consisting only of a right to be free from restrictive laws or other forms of state
intervention into family or social relations that unreasonably and unnecessarily
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children.'0°  According to
Justice Dennis, the source of the obstacle to Sudwischer's ability to prove
filiation was not any form of state action, but rather the unilateral choice of a
private party, Schuh. Thus, Sudwischer's constitutional rights were not
implicated, and the constitutional balance should have been struck only between
Schuh's acknowledged and important privacy rights on the one hand and the
state's interest in forcing her to submit to a blood test on the other-a balance
which Justice Dennis had no difficulty in striking in favor of Schuh.'"'
The substantive rights of Ms. Sudwischer were not in dispute; Louisiana law
is clear that an illegitimate child is entitled to a share in her biological father's
succession.1° ' However that right could attach only if she were able to prove
that biological relationship, and do so by the required "clear and convincing"
evidence. Thus the novel question was, as Justice Dennis pointed out, whether
Sudwischer enjoys any constitutionally protected "right to prove filiation" which
would be infringed by the state if it failed to order Schuh to submit to a blood
test. This latter question lies at the intersection of "substantive" and "procedur-
al" constitutional law. Resolution requires consideration of at least three related,
but separable, issues. The first is a question of constitutional law; whether the
The invasion of [her] privacy is minimal. [She] has the alternative of conceding a relationship to
[Sudwischerl." Id. at 476 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 477-78 (Dennis, J., joined by Calogero, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 478-79 (Dennis, J., joined by Calogero, C.J., dissenting). Justice Dennis characterized
the state's legitimate interest in requiring blood tests to help prove filiation as being limited to the
admittedly valid purpose of securing support for needy children. Since Sudwischer could derive no
support from the deceased, Justice Dennis saw the state's interest in this case as "minimal" and
outweighed by Schuh's privacy rights. Id.
Cf. In re J.M., 590 So. 2d 565 (La. 1991), denying putative father's declaratory action seeking to
declare statutes authorizing blood tests in paternity cases unconstitutional. Similarly to Sudwischer,
the court in J.M. unanimously reaffirmed that a court-ordered blood test is a search and seizure but
that it is only "minimally intrusive." The court, including Justice Dennis, went on to hold that the
father's privacy interests here were outweighed by the state's compelling interest in securing the
welfare of children and avoiding the need for public support. The court also held explicitly what was
implicit in Sudwischer, that procedural due process requires that the applicant must make a prima
facie case of paternity before the tests will be ordered.
102. La. Civ. Code art. 888 was revised in 1981 to remove prior language that had limited
succession rights to "legitimate" descendants. See also, to the same effect, La. Civ. Code art.
3506(8), defining "children" to include those "whose filiation to the parent has been established in
the manner provided by law .. " A number of federal Supreme Court decisions have likewise held
that, where the fact of a biological relationship has been shown, state laws which unjustifiably
discriminate against illegitimates violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535,
93 S. Ct. 872 (1973); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968).
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state or federal constitution should be interpreted to confer on Sudwischer some
sort of right to a "reasonable opportunity to show" that she is a daughter of the
deceased. If so, a second question of application of law to facts arises; whether
the combination of a statutory requirement that a claimant prove filiation by
"clear and convincing" evidence, combined with an inability to procure blood for
DNA testing, effectively deprives that litigant of a reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate her status. If so, a third "state action" question arises; whether a
court's failure to order the blood tests could be considered, on the facts of this
case, to constitute an interference by the government with that right.
The first sub-question should be answered in the affirmative, thus granting
illegitimates the right to a "reasonable opportunity to show" filiation, for several
reasons. First, as the Sudwischer majority may have implied, such a right could
be seen as a conceptually necessary procedural derivative from the substantive
right at issue-here, the substantive right of illegitimates to equal treatment with
respect to the administration of estates. The Sudwischer majority's assertion that
the plaintiff enjoyed a constitutional right to prove filiation to her deceased father
was supported only by a single citation, Trimble v. Gordon,'0 3 a federal case
construing the federal Equal Protection clause. While Justice Dennis is correct
that Trimble did not articulate a "right to filiate" per se, the Court was required
in that case to balance the state's interest in orderly administration of estates and
in preclusion of spurious claims of paternity against the individual illegitimate's
interest in having a fair opportunity to prove her relation to the deceased. As the
Trimble court concluded, the state's asserted interests are legitimate, and may be
furthered by rules of procedure and proof that impose some burdens on purported
illegitimates," but restrictions cannot "be made into an impenetrable barrier
that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination."'' 0 5 So too with respect
103. 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977), cited in Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 476.
104. Id. at 770, 97 S. Ct. at 1465 (recognizing that laws governing succession are a mixture of
substantive and procedural rules, and that problems of proof may be particularly troublesome in cases
like this).
105. Id. at 771, 97 S. Ct. at 1466 (quoting Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538, 93 S. Ct. 872,
875 (1973)). It could be argued that Trimble is inapposite because the actual issue was not, as here,
the prior question of what opportunity the alleged illegitimate child must be given to prove a
biological relationship to a non-marital parent, but rather the subsequent question of whether the law
could discriminate against one who had already demonstrated that biological relationship. It could
further be argued that the issues in Sudwischer are more closely analogous to those in cases like
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 111, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983), in which the federal Supreme Court upheld laws which in some sense
precluded the plaintiff from demonstrating such a relationship. This argument has some force. It
does not, however, undercut the thrust of the argument made here, because neither Michael H. nor
Lehr involved a pure "access to proof' issue of the sort that was at stake in Sudwischer. Rather both,
like Trimble, involved what were, at bottom, issues of substantive law.
In Michael H., the issue at bar was whether California could apply a statutory conclusive
presumption (that a child born to cohabiting, potent, married parents was a child of the marital father)
to cut off the opportunity of another man to prove that he was in fact the child's biological father.
In upholding the statute, the Court in Michael H. correctly hoted that such a conclusive presumption
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to the Louisiana constitution.' °6
This result should not be surprising. A substantive right to equal treatment for
illegitimates (or any other class) would be little more than an illusion if the state
were permitted to erect barriers of proof or procedure that effectively precluded
plaintiffs from demonstrating the predicate facts that would entitle them to
constitutional protection. Thus, the substantive guarantees of equal treatment that
have been found to be implicit in the federal Constitution and that are expressly
stated in the state constitution could reasonably be interpreted to include a
derivative right to a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate the facts necessary to
support a claim that those rights have been violated in a particular case.
operates and should be analyzed as an issue of substantive rather than procedural law. Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 119-21; 109 S. Ct. at 2340-41. In other words, the California law did not cut off
plaintiff's access to proof so much as it made the predicate fact that he was trying to prove legally
irrelevant.
In Lehr, the issue at bar was whether New York had an obligation to notify plaintiff of adoption
proceedings concerning his alleged biological child. The Court's conclusion that the state's conduct
did not violate the federal Constitution did not, however, turn on any argument that an alleged
biological parent may be precluded from generating proof of his relationship to the child. Rather,
the Court's majority found that since the plaintiff had failed to register himself as the child's father
(a simple step that would have guaranteed him notice of adoption or similar proceedings) and had
never had any significant custodial, personal or financial relationship with the child, he lacked any
protectable "liberty interest" in his relationship with the child. Thus, the procedural protections of
the federal due process clause never attached at all. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-65, 103 S. Ct. at 2993-95.
Any issue regarding the scope of his procedural rights thus could never arise.
The contrasts between Sudwischer and Michael H. and Lehr are thus apparent. Unlike in Michael
H, the fact which Ms. Sudwischer was trying to prove-her biological relationship to the
deceased-remained outcome-determinative under Louisiana law. And, unlike the plaintiff in Lehr,
Ms. Sudwischer had a clear "property interest" at stake in her attempts to participate in her alleged
father's estate-thus providing, for her, the requisite predicate for attachment of procedural rights
under the federal and state due process clauses. In short, in none of these cases has the federal
Supreme Court squarely addressed the question that was presented in Sudwischer, that is, whether
laws which grant substantive rights to those who succeed in proving a biological relation to another
also give rise to some derivative right to access to the proof required to fulfill the statutory condition.
In such circumstances, the language from Trimble regarding the impropriety of erecting an
"impenetrable barrier" to an alleged illegitimate's assertion of her substantive rights-distinguishable
on the facts though that case may have been-remains a valid statement of the law, and one on
which the Louisiana Supreme Court was entitled to rely.
106. See, e.g., Succession of Grice, 462 So. 2d 131 (La. 1985), upholding a 19-year prescription
period for filiation claims. Though the court in Grice concluded that the procedural restriction at
stake in that case was valid, it did so only after carefully considering, in light of Trimble and other
cases, whether that procedural restriction violated equality principles. While Grice can be criticized
for its failure to consider whether the state constitution provides greater protection for illegitimates
than does the federal Constitution, see discussion infra at notes 129-135 and accompanying text, it
makes clear that the state constitution provides at least the same degree of derivative protection of
the right to prove one's status against unreasonable procedural restrictions. Cf Gauthreaux v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 588 So. 2d 723, 725 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 409 (La. 1992),
suggesting that the Louisiana Supreme Court should reexamine whether permitting a statute of
limitations to expire during a potential plaintiffs minority violates principles of equal protection, due
process, and access to courts under the state and federal constitutions.
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Alternatively, this same asserted right to a reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate one's relationship to the deceased might be founded on the due
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions 7 or on the state
constitution's guarantee of access to courts. 0 8  The core of the due process
clause is a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. And, as has been
recognized in other contexts, the right to be heard includes a right to a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence on one's own behalf, in order to
demonstrate relevant facts. 1 9
107. La. Const. art. I, § 2, provides, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
except by due process of law." U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV, provide similarly.
108. La. Const. art. I, § 22 provides as follows:
Section 22. Access to Courts
Section 22. All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by
due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable
delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.
As Professor Hargrave has noted, this provision has been interpreted as "essentially a second due
process clause and not a substantial expansion of flexible due process rights." Lee Hargrave, The
Louisiana Constitution: A Reference Guide 42 (1991). However, its plain text would appear to go
somewhat beyond a mere "due process" clause, and to do so in a way that has relevance to situations
like that presented in Sudwischer. The core of a due process guarantee appears to be phrased as a
"negative" right-that is, a right to be free from actions by the state that have the effect of depriving
one of, for example, property without observing proper procedures. The "access to courts" provision
is at least facially susceptible to a broader interpretation-as a "positive" right requiring the state to
affirmatively act to provide fair procedures for redress of acts by private parties that have the effect
of, for example, wrongfully depriving one of property.
109. Such a due process-based right to a reasonable opportunity to prove one's case has been
recognized by Louisiana and federal courts in a number of similar contexts. See City of New Orleans
v. United Gas Pipeline, 436 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 442 So. 2d 452 (La. 1983),
and cases cited therein. A further analogy could be drawn to another set of cases lying at the
intersection of due process and equal protection concerns: the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions.
At the time when the present Louisiana Constitution was adopted, it was already well understood that
the federal Fourteenth Amendment precluded governments from adopting laws that cut off the ability
of a litigant to show that the factual presumptions underlying the generally reasonable distinctions
drawn by the law did not in fact obtain in that litigant's particular case. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974) (public school teacher must be given an
opportunity to prove her ability to continue employment after her fourth month of pregnancy);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973) (alien cannot be refused public
employment without being afforded an opportunity to show that citizenship is not required for that
job); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400 (1972) (state workers
compensation law could not preclude illegitimate child from receiving survivor benefits unless that
child is given an opportunity to prove actual dependence on deceased); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972) (unmarried father cannot be deprived of parental rights in a custody
proceeding without being given a chance to show his fitness as a parent). See generally Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1619-24 (2d ed. 1988). Though commentators disagree about
the ultimate foundations of this body of law, it can be seen as reflecting an important insight about
due process-that a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate relevant facts is a necessary part of that
"hearing" to which litigants are, in all but extraordinary cases, entitled.
Note, however, this analogy may not be exact. Irrebuttable presumptions have been likened to
rules of substantive law, and their constitutionality has been judged accordingly. See, e.g., Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-21, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2340-41 (1989).
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Though the point is less certain, it appears that the second sub-ques-
tion-whether an inability to procure blood for DNA testing would effectively
deprive plaintiff of any reasonable opportunity to meet the statutory requirement
that a claimant prove filiation by "clear and convincing" evidence-could be
answered in the affirmative as well. In a case involving somewhat similar
issues, Little v. Streater,"t the federal Supreme Court held that where state law
places a strict evidentiary burden on the defendant in a paternity suit,"' the
state was required to pay for blood grouping tests sought by an indigent named
as defendant in such a suit. As the Court argued:
Under Connecticut law ... the defendant in a paternity suit is placed
at a distinct disadvantage in that his testimony alone is insufficient to
overcome the plaintiff's prima facie case. Among the most probative
additional evidence the defendant might offer are the results of blood
grouping tests, but if he is indigent, the State essentially denies him that
reliable scientific proof by requiring that he bear its cost .... Yet not
only is the State inextricably involved in paternity litigation such as this
and responsible for the imbalance between the parties, it in effect
forecloses what is potentially a conclusive means for an indigent
defendant to surmount that disparity and exonerate himself. Such a
practice is irreconcilable with the command of the Due Process
Clause." 2
So too, it would seem, in Sudwischer. While full analysis of this issue would
require consideration of what other sources of evidence would be available to
plaintiff Sudwischer, her situation seems broadly similar to that of the indigent
defendant in Little. In both cases, state law imposed a burden of proof that could
not be readily satisfied without resort to scientific evidence. In both cases,
access to that evidence was cut off, thus depriving the parties attempting to carry
that evidentiary burden of a realistic opportunity to prove their case.
The third sub-question-whether a court's failure to order the blood tests
involves the kind of "state action" which is necessary to trigger constitutional
protection of Sudwischer's interests-may be more difficult to resolve. It is
axiomatic that the rights guaranteed by the federal Bill of Rights apply only to
the actions of governments; private parties are generally subject to constitutional
110. 452 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981).
III. Connecticut law provided that, where an unwed mother consistently accuses the defendant
of paternity, her accusation constitutes prima facie proof of paternity. The reputed father was then
required to bear the burden of proving his innocence and do so "by other evidence than his own."
Id. at 10-11, 101 S. Ct. at 2207 (quoting Mosher v. Bennett, 144 A. 297, 298 (1929)).
112. Id. at 12, 101 S. Ct. at 2208-9. The Court went on to judge the validity of the state law
under the balancing test of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). It concluded
that the Connecticut statute (requiring the individual seeking blood grouping tests to pay for them)
may be valid in most cases but that its application in this case deprived the defendant of an effective
opportunity to be heard. Little, 452 U.S. at 13-17, 101 S. Ct. at 2209-11.
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restraint only if they are directly influenced by, act in concert with, or stand in
the place of some government entity or official." 3  And, while the issue is
113. As the federal courts have phrased it, the "state action" limit on the scope of federal
constitutional rights posits an "essential dichotomy ... between deprivation by the State, subject to
scrutiny under [the Constitution], and private conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful; against
which the Fourteenth Amendment generally offers no shield."' Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 349, 95 S. Ct. 449, 453 (1974) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct.
836, 842 (1948)). With the single exception of the Thirteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution, which prohibits slavery, all federal constitutional rights have been held to apply only
in the context of "state action."
With respect to the federal Constitution, the textual basis for this dichotomy between public and
purely private action is clear. The federal Bill of Rights was originally conceived as limiting only
the actions of the newly formed federal government. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833). The primary textual warrant for extending its prohibitions to other possible actors is
found in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "No State shall" deprive persons within
its jurisdiction of fundamental rights. U.S. Const. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
The hard question, not surprisingly, has been how to define the nature and degree of connection
between governments and assertedly private actors that is sufficient to allow a finding of state action,
thus triggering application of the substantive protections of the federal Constitution. The federal
Supreme Court has identified a number of rationales to determine when state action will be found,
all of which were initially interpreted expansively. One such rationale, the "public function" doctrine,
posited that a private party will be subject to constitutional restraint when it supplants the state as
a provider of necessary public facilities. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S. Ct. 486 (1966)
(privately owned municipal park); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S. Ct. 809 (1953) (private
political "club" that effectively controlled local politics); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct.
276 (1946) (company town). Alternatively, state action could be found if there was a sufficiently
close connection between some government entity and the assertedly private wrongdoer. This
connection could take the form of official authorization, encouragement, or enforcement of the private
party's unconstitutional action. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982)
(private creditor caused clerk of court to issue writ of attachment); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
87 S. Ct. 1627 (1967) (state constitutional amendment found to have effect of "encouraging" private
discrimination); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948) (state court enforcement of
restrictive covenant among private parties). Alternatively, the requisite connection could be found
based on government subsidy of or other "entanglement" with the private actor. Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 94 S. Ct. 2416 (1974) (entanglement found where city gave private
school privileged access to city parks); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct.
856 (1961) (private restaurant operated symbiotically with public parking garage).
More recently, the federal Supreme Court has redefined each of these rationales so as to generally
restrict the number of assertedly private parties who will be required to observe federal constitutional
norms. The "public function" doctrine has been redefined to apply only to entities that provide
services or wield powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State or traditionally associated
with sovereignty. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) (U.S. Olympic Committee not performing "public function"); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974) (power company not performing
"public function"). The Court has similarly redefined the degree of state "encouragement" of or
"entanglement" with private actors necessary to trigger constitutional scrutiny. A plaintiff must
ordinarily show either that a state official was directly (albeit perhaps only ministerially) involved
in carrying out the challenged deprivation, or that the state is "responsible," because of its coercive
power or other significant encouragement, for the "specific conduct" alleged to be unconstitutional.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982) (private school not bound by
constitution despite receiving virtually all of its funds and students from public authorities); Moose
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considerably less clear, the Louisiana Declaration of Rights has been held to
incorporate similar, though not necessarily identical, restrictions. 114 In
Sudwischer, unlike Little, access to the necessary scientific evidence was denied
by the unilateral choice of an adverse private party, not by any decision or policy
that could be directly attributed to the state-a fact which in Justice Dennis'
opinion precluded finding of any infringement of Sudwischer's constitutional
rights.t t However, this private choice cannot be realistically divorced from
government involvement in the events which effectively deprived the plaintiff of
her "right to prove filiation." Sufficient government involvement to warrant a
finding of constitutional infringement can be found on the facts of
Sudwischer-sufficient to satisfy both the stricter requirements of federal law,
and what may be less restrictive state-based analysis of the "state action"
concept.
Assuming first that the state guarantees of equality and due process would not
apply in the absence of state action, as federal courts define that term, one could
argue that Sudwischer demonstrates sufficient official involvement in the events at
issue to trigger constitutional protections. The federal case chiefly relied upon by
Justice Dennis, Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,'1 6 does hold that, under ordinary
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972) (private club pervasively regulated by
the state through liquor licenses was not a state actor).
114. The question of whether and to what extent application of the Louisiana Declaration of
Rights of 1974 can apply to restrict non-governmental infringers has not been directly or
comprehensively addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. There are, however, indications that
some form of state action requirement should be read into that Declaration. The very first section
of the Declaration states that: "The rights enumerated in this Article are inalienable by the state and
shall be preserved inviolate by the state." La. Const. art. 1, § 1. A reading of this section as
incorporating a "state action" restriction on the application of the state Declaration of Rights could
be supported by considerations such as that the framers' debates contain indications that they
presupposed that constitutional rights generally bind only governments and that where the framers
wanted state constitutional rights guarantees to apply against private infringers, the particular
provisions say so explicitly. See, e.g., La. Const. art. I, § 3 (most of the prohibitions are phrased in
terms of restrictions on the state in its lawmaking capacity ("No law shall..."), but the prohibition
on slavery is phrased without that restriction so as to make it applicable to private actors) and La.
Const. art. I, § 12 (right to freedom from discrimination specifically intended and phrased to apply
to private actors). For these reasons, among others, some state courts have held or implied that
particular state rights guarantees apply only to governmental actors. Clark v. State, 434 So. 2d 1276,
1278 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 492 So. 2d 452 (1983) (equality protections of the state
constitution, like its federal counterpart, apply to "every kind of state action"); Vangraff, Inc. v.
McCearley, 314 So. 2d 483 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 318 So. 2d 51, and application denied,
320 So. 2d 549 (1975) (due process protections of the state constitution, like its federal counterpart,
apply only if there is state action).
On the other hand, there are countervailing indications that the rights protected by the Louisiana
Constitution are not limited by any requirement of state action, or, if some version of the doctrine
is required, that the doctrine will not be interpreted as narrowly as the federal courts have interpreted
it. See discussion infra at notes 120-122.
115. It is noteworthy that, in considering the "state action" issue in Sudwischer, Justice Dennis
cited only federal precedent.
116. 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978). In Flagg, a private warehouseman took advantage
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circumstances, private parties cannot be held to be clothed with state action merely
because government organs have passively acquiesced in their choices." 7
However, the government's relationship to the events in Sudwischer goes beyond
mere acquiescence in a private decision, privately enforced. In a line of federal
cases exemplified by Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. 8 and Shelley
v. Kraemer,"9 the federal Supreme Court has consistently found state action
present when the alleged deprivation of rights takes place in the context of a
judicial proceeding or is enforced by the actions, however ministerial, of the courts.
In Sudwischer, the potential deprivation of the illegitimate's rights inhered not
solely in any inability to perform a blood test on Schuh, but rather in the conse-
quences of that inability-the erection of an effective obstacle to sharing in her
alleged father's estate. As in Edmondson, this deprivation of a share in the estate
took place in the context of a judicial proceeding and was enforced by a judicial
decree. As in Edmondson, a strong case for the existence of state action could be
made, even under the normally restrictive definition employed by federal courts.
Moreover, even if federal definitions of state action were not satisfied under
the facts of Sudwischer, the Louisiana Declaration of Rights might apply anyway.
Good reasons exist why portions of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights should be
interpreted to apply even in the absence of "state action" or, if some version of the
doctrine is required, why it should not be interpreted as narrowly for purposes of
the state constitution as it has been interpreted for purposes of the federal
Constitution. First, many of the substantive rights guarantees of the state
constitution are phrased not as restrictions on the state,120 but rather as statements
of an absolute right containing no textual restriction as to the nature of possible
infringers. For example, Section 5 of the state Declaration is phrased in absolute
terms, stating only that "[elvery person shall be secure" from infringements of their
privacy rights. Perhaps for this reason, Louisiana courts have on occasion
interpreted the state constitution to apply to private actors in situations where "state
action" in the federal sense was not present.' 2 ' Moreover, if the Louisiana
of a state law permitting him to satisfy a lien on goods in his possession by selling them. Plaintiff
claimed that the sale deprived her of property without due process of law in violation of the federal
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that plaintiff showed no state action and thus no violation
of federal constitutional rights.
117. Id. at 164-66, 98 S. Ct. at 1737-38 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972)).
118. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991), holding that a civil litigant could not exercise peremptory
challenges to jurors in a racially discriminatory manner. Although the "choice" at issue was wholly
private, the context of a court proceeding and the necessary, though minimal, action of the judge in
actually excusing challenged jurors were sufficient to find "state action."
119. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948), holding that a private racially restrictive covenant could
not be enforced by judicial injunction. Any act by the courts to enforce that racial exclusion would
constitute state action, triggering the protections of the federal Equal Protection clause.
120. A typical phrasing, for example, might be one that states that "no law shall" derogate from
the rights granted in that particular provision.
121. See, e.g., Ahlum v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 617 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 624 So. 2d 1230 (1993) (holding that student disciplinary decision by private
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Supreme Court were to squarely hold that portions of the state constitution apply
in the absence of "state action" in the relatively narrow federal sense, that court
would not be standing alone. Rather, it would be in the tradition of a number of
courts in other states which have rejected or relaxed state action limits on the
application of their respective state constitutions.1
2
Finally, regardless of the technicalities of federal or state "state action"
analysis, recognition that the events in Sudwischer violated plaintiff's constitutional
rights seems intuitively appropriate. It was the state that chose to impose on
plaintiff the burden of proving her case by "clear and convincing" evidence. In
such circumstances, it seems inappropriate-as the Sudwischer majority implicitly
agreed-to permit the state to claim that it is "not involved" when it allows an
opposing litigant to block plaintiff's access to evidence needed to carry this state-
imposed burden.
B. Short Takes
As has become typical over the last several years, Louisiana's constitutional
guarantee of privacy'23 has produced a number of noteworthy decisions. Though
university could be reviewed by the courts on an "arbitrary and capricious" standard); State v.
Nelson, 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978) (departing from federal precedent to hold evidence resulting from
an illegal search inadmissible, even though parties conducting search were private parties); Dumez
v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 334 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 337 So. 2d
225 (1976) (holding that private association was subject to constraints of state equal protection and
due process guarantees).
122. Such decisions have arisen in the context of several types of state rights guarantees,
including state guarantees of "privacy," Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123
(Alaska 1989); Porten v. University of San Francisco. 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), state
guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341
(Cal. 1979), aft'd, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (1980),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102 S. Ct. 867 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981); Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (requiring state action, but departing from federal analysis), state guarantees of
equality, Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542 (1984) (requiring state action, but
departing from federal analysis), and state guarantees of due process, Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac,
Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1169 (N.Y. 1978) (requiring state action, but departing from federal analysis).
To be sure, many state courts have continued to hold that state rights guarantees may not be
applied in the absence of state action in the federal sense. See, e.g., Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham
Recall Comm., 767 P.2d,719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432
So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985);
Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1985); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982
Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986); Southcenter Joint Venture
v. National Democratic Policy Comm'n, 780 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 1989); Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d
832 (Wis. 1987). However, arguments can be made that state constitutions differ from their federal
counterpart in ways that make across-the-board adoption of federal state action precedent
inappropriate. See generally Cole, supra note 81; Devlin, supra note 81; Friesen, supra note 81.
123. La. Const. art. 1, § 5, quoted, in part, supra at note 32.
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State v. Perry"4 and Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 25 both of which are
discussed above, are certainly the most important, they are not alone. In other
decisions, the Louisiana courts have upheld the "disclosural" privacy interests of
participants in auto accidents,1 26 but permitted the state to require a drug test of
an employee who was reasonably suspected of using drugs, 127 and a blood DNA
test of an individual indicted for rape.
128
With respect to the equality guarantee of the state constitution,129 the most
interesting development appears to be the possibly uncertain status of Sibley v.
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University. 30 In Sibley, the Louisiana
Supreme Court established the method for analyzing such claims under the state
constitution-a method which differed significantly from standard "tier" analyses
of the cognate Equal Protection clause of the federal Fourteenth Amendment.'
3
'
124. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1993), discussed supra at notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
125. 589 So. 2d 474 (La. 1991), discussed supra at notes 93-122.
126. DeSalvo v. State. 624 So. 2d 897 (La. 1993). The statutes at issue permitted police auto
accident reports to be disclosed to third parties only for very limited purposes and specifically did
not permit them to be disclosed to attorneys who might seek to use the information therein for direct
mail advertising to potential clients. The statute was challenged as violative of the attorney's federal
First Amendment and state equal protection rights. The court held that the legislature's desire to
protect the participants' constitutionally recognized interest in avoiding disclosure of private
information constituted a sufficient government interest to support the legislation under both federal
"commercial free speech" and state equal treatment analysis.
127. Banks v. Department of Pub. Safety and Corrections, 598 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1992). Compare Phelps v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 611 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992), reaffirming the courts prior holding in Holthus v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 580 So.
2d 469 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 1162 (1991), that the Racing Commission's rules
requiring jockeys and other racetrack workers to submit to random drug testing did not violate those
employees' privacy rights under § 5. The failure of the court in Holthus to distinguish between
federal and state constitutional privacy standards was criticized in a prior article in this series. John
Devlin and David Hilburn, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments in the Law, 1990-1991, 52
La. L. Rev. 575, 589-92 (1992). In Phelps, the court noted that the state constitution is more
protective of privacy rights than is the federal constitution and called for Louisiana Supreme Court
review of the issue. Phelps, 611 So. 2d at 741.
128. State v. Pierre, 606 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), discussed supra at note 96.
129. La. Const. art. I, § 3, provides as follows:
Section 3. Right to Individual Dignity
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate
against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and
involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
130. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
131. Id. at 1104-1108. Briefly, the judicially constructed federal analysis applies one of three
general standards of review-"strict," "intermediate" and "rational basis" review-depending on the
nature of the classification or the right at issue. See generally John E. Nowack and Ronald D.
Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 14.3, at 573-90 (4th ed. 1991).
Before Sibley, Louisiana courts interpreted and applied the state equality guarantee according to
the same analysis as was applied by federal courts to the federal Equal Protection clause. In Sibley,
the Louisiana Supreme Court looked to the more complete text of the state provision and derived a
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While many recent appellate cases have continued to cite and apply Sibley when
analyzing claims under the state equality guarantee,'32 others have not done so,
and have instead interpreted the state constitution according to federal or pre-Sibley
Louisiana precedents.3 3 Moreover, even when Justices have relied upon Sibley,
they have often tended to conflate its analysis with the analysis employed under the
federal Equal Protection clause." It is to be hoped that these latter cases do not
significantly different analysis:
(1) When the law classifies individuals by race or religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated
completely; (2) When the statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture,
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, its enforcement shall be refused unless
the state or other advocate of the classification shows that the classification has a
reasonable basis; (3) When the law classifies individuals on any other basis, it shall be
rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged class shows that it does not suitably
further any appropriate state interest.
Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107-08. For a discussion of how the Sibley test has been applied, see Michael
L. Berry, Jr., Comment, Equal Protection-The Louisiana Experience in Departing From Generally
Accepted Federal Analysis, 49 La. L. Rev. 903 (1989); John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Low,
Developments in the Low, 1988-1989, 51 La. L. Rev. 295, 306-12 (1990) (discussing analysis of
distinctions based upon unenumerated categories under § 3 and Sibley).
132. See, e.g., DeSalvo v. State, 624 So. 2d 897 (La. 1993) (upholding a statute denying auto
accident information to lawyers seeking clients); Flagship Ctr., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 587 So.
2d 154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (striking down ordinance distinguishing between cable television
bingo proprietors and bingo hall owners). See also Succession of Lauga, 614 So. 2d 55 (La. 1993)
(Kimball, J., dissenting), arguing that legislation defining "forced heirs" as only incompetents or
children under the age of 23 did not constitute impermissible discrimination on the basis of age.
133. See, e.g., Talley v. Succession of Stuckey, 614 So. 2d 55 (La. 1993) (striking down a
statute providing for invalidation of a will if a legitimate-but not an illegitimate-child is
subsequently born; analyzing state and federal constitutional challenges together and citing only pre-
Sibley Louisiana precedent); Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992) (upholding
a statutory cap on general damages in medical malpractice actions; citing Sibley in its discussion of
the history of the damages cap issue, but failing to perform any Sibley-type analysis; relying instead
primarily on federal and sister-state precedent); State v. Vining, 609 So. 2d 984 (La. 1992), cert.
denied sub nom. Butler v. Medley, 113 S. Ct. 2334 (1993) (statute criminalizing carnal knowledge
of a juvenile only if the perpetrator is male; relying solely on federal and pre-Sibley state precedent);
State v. Brown, 606 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992) (upholding enhanced penalties for drug
crimes committed near schools; similar non-Sibley analysis); Gauthreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 588
So. 2d 723 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 409 (La. 1992) (upholding statute
permitting prescriptive period for tort action by minor to expire before plaintiff reached majority;
citing Sibley, but treating federal and state equal protection analyses as identical).
134. A striking example of this phenomenon can be found in Justice Dennis' dissent in Talley
v. Succession of Stuckey, 614 So. 2d 55 (La. 1993), in which the court considered Louisiana Civil
Code article 1705. That article provided for automatic revocation of a testament in the event that a
legitimate-but not an illegitimate-child of the testator was subsequently born. The majority found
that article 1705 violated the equality guarantee of § 3 of the state Declaration of Rights and cured
the defect by extending the conclusive presumption that the testator would have wished to modify
the testament to cover illegitimates as well. Id. at 58-61. As noted supra at note 133, the majority's
decision was based not on any analysis under Sibley, but rather on federal and pre-Sibley state
precedents.
Equally instructive is the treatment of Sibley in the dissenting opinion of Justice Dennis, Sibley's
author. In that dissent, Justice Dennis discussesSibley and correctly identifies the discrimination at
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herald any sub silentio abandonment of Sibley. Whatever may be the merits of the
particular analytic approach established in that case, the crucial reality is that the
state equality guarantee was not written solely to mimic the federal Equal
Protection clause. Interpretation of the state provision solely or even primarily by
reference to federal precedents is untrue both to the plain language of Section 3 and
to the intentions of those who wrote it.
35
The guarantee of "due process" in Section 2 of the state Declaration of
Rights 36 has also been the focus of significant decisions. In a case that will be
of comfort to attorneys, the supreme court held that the "substantive" protections
embodied in Section 2 require that attorneys who are involuntarily appointed to
defend indigents in capital cases must be compensated. 37  While most statutes
challenged on purely procedural due process grounds have been upheld,'38 courts
have relied upon Section 2 to hold that an alleged biological father could not be
estopped from denying paternity for purposes of a state's motion for a deficiency
judgment arising out of a previously adjudicated award of support' 39 and that a
law expanding the ability of workers compensation carriers to obtain reimburse-
issue in Talley as subject to special scrutiny under § 3, which specifically prohibits laws which
"arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth." La. Const.
art 1, § 3. However, Justice Dennis did not concentrate on performing the analysis called for in
Sibley-i.e., examining the proofs offered by the proponents of the statute to see if they had
affirmatively demonstrated that the classification has a reasonable basis. Instead, he appeared to
amalgamate this category of analysis under Sibley with federal cases analyzing according to the
"intermediate" tier of review under the federal Equal Protection clause. Talley, 614 So. 2d at 62
(Dennis, J., dissenting). In light of the Sibley court's vociferous rejection of federal "tier" analysis,
Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1105-07, this amalgamation seems curious, to say the least.
135. The textual differences between the state and federal provisions are self-evident. It is also
clear that the expanded language of § 3 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights was intended to
provide more extensive protection for equality interests than is available under the federal Equal
Protection clause. See, e.g., W. Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1974).
136. La. Const. art. I, § 2, quoted supra at note 107.
137. State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425 (La. 1993). Compare State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Azhar, 620 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1993), upholding La. R.S. 22:658(A)(1), which requires insurers to
make an unconditional tender of payment to insureds who suffer loss, but does not permit recovery
of any overage from the insured if the loss is ultimately adjudicated to be less than the tender. The
court did not expressly consider any constitutional challenges to the statute. It may be, however, that
the statute works an unjustifiable forfeiture of the insurers' property in violation of the substantive
protections of La. Const. art. I, § 2, or the protections of property rights set out in La. Const. art. 1,
§ 4, or both. The Azhar decision will be the subject of a forthcoming student note in this review.
138. See, e.g., Martin v. Rush's Fabricate Ctr., Inc., 590 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991)
(upholding new workers' compensation statute against procedural due process and equal protection
challenges); Gauthreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 588 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992) (upholding
statute permitting running of prescription of minor's tort claim during his minority against challenges
based on state guarantees of procedural due process and access to courts, La. Const. art I, §§ 2, 14).
139. In re Brisco, 598 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992). The court so held even though the
putative father had never previously contested paternity despite eleven prior court appearances on the
matter, stretching over the course of 14 years.
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ment from funds recovered by workers in third-party actions cannot be applied
retroactively to claims arising out of pre-amendment events.
40
Other individual rights guaranteed by the Louisiana Declaration of Rights also
received some attention. Included are several recent decisions regarding the state
guarantee of property rights,' 41 the state guarantee against laws impairing the
obligation of contracts, 42 and the state guarantee of the right to vote.43
III. INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY
A. Of Gambling, Forced Heirs and the Constitutional Restraints on Legislation
In two recent cases, Polk v. Edwards44 and Succession of Lauga,45 the
Louisiana Supreme Court was required to determine the extent to which the
legislature is constrained by state constitutional provisions which embody particular
policy preferences of the framers and ratifiers of the state constitution. By coming
to opposite conclusions in the two cases, the court sowed confusion regarding how
such provisions should be interpreted, and may have left itself open to charges that
its decisions in this area are more result-driven than analytically consistent.
Nonetheless, the decisions can be seen as compatible and together may mark a new
140. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809 (La. 1992) (holding that
amendment worked a "substantive" change in the law and thus could not be applied retroactively
without violating La. Const. art. I, § 2).
141. La. Const. art. 1, § 4, provides broad and extensive protection for property rights in this
state. However, litigation has centered around only that portion of the section that concerns
compensation for expropriated property. See, e.g., State Dep't of Transp. and Dev. v. Chambers Inv.
Co., 595 So. 2d 598 (La. 1992) (holding that property owners need not be compensated for delays
imposed on owner's ability to develop land caused by highway construction on adjoining parcels;
owner must tolerate inconveniences caused by appropriate activity on adjoining land); Packard's
Western Store Inc. v. State Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 618 So. 2d 1166 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, No. 93-C-1961, 1993 LEXIS 3151 (La. Nov. 5, 1993) (lessee of expropriated property can
recover for business losses for period after expiration of lease if it can show option or other
reasonable expectation that the lease would have been renewed); Obermier v. State, 606 So. 2d 937
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 609 So. 2d 257 (La. 1992) (holding that district attorney's actions
in restricting access to building where murder took place during the criminal investigation did not
constitute an expropriation requiring compensation); Lakeshore Harbor Condominium Dev. v. City
of New Orleans, 603 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (where substantial economic value
remained, rezoning did not constitute taking for which compensation is due).
142. Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 586 So. 2d 722 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
reversed on other grounds, 602 So. 2d 704 (1992), holding that termination of public employee's job
by operation of law did not violate either the federal or state "contracts clause." La. Const. art I, §
23.
143. Branton v. Webster Parish Sch. Bd., 596 So. 2d 840 (La. App.2d Cir. 1992), relying in part
on the state constitutional guarantee of the right to vote, La. Const. art. I, § 10, to uphold special
bond election in which all voters voted, against challenge that franchise should have been restricted
to property taxpayers only.
144. 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993).
145. 625 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993).
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level of sophistication in the court's analysis of constitutional provisions which
assertedly restrain the legislature's freedom of action.
1. Polk v. Edwards and the Legislature's Obligation to "Suppress"
Gambling
Religious-based opposition to gambling and the state's historical experience
with the corruption which surrounded the nineteenth century Louisiana Lottery
Company146 led to a long series of state constitutional provisions outlawing
lotteries in this state and, more generally, declaring gambling to be a vice which the
legislature was directed to "suppress.' ' 47  The Louisiana Constitution of 1974
followed its predecessors in this regard and, in Article XII, section 6, provides,
"Gambling shall be defined by and suppressed by the legislature."'' 48 Despite that
146. Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution-A Reference Guide 9-10 (1991).
147. The first state constitutional provision outlawing lotteries appeared in Article 116 of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1845. The prohibition was deleted from subsequent constitutions of 1852,
1861, and 1864, thus permitting the creation of the Louisiana Lottery Company and its resultant
scandals. The Louisiana Constitution of 1879 contained two relevant provisions, the first continuing
the Louisiana Lottery until 1895, and the second declaring gambling to be a vice and directing the
legislature to "suppress" it:
Art. 167
The General Assembly shall have authority to grant lottery charters or privileges;
provided, each charter or privilege shall not pay less than forty thousand dollars per
annum in money into the treasury of the State; and provided further, that all charters shall
cease and expire on the first of January, 1895, from which time all lotteries are prohibited
in the State.
Art. 172
Gambling is declared to be a vice, and the General Assembly shall enact laws for its
suppression.
La. Const. of 1879, arts. 167 & 172. The Louisiana Constitutions of 1898 and 1913 contained
similar provisions absolutely prohibiting lotteries and directing the legislature to "suppress" the "vice"
of gambling. La. Const. of 1898, arts. 178 & 188; La. Const. of 1913, arts. 178 & 188. In the
Louisiana Constitution of 1921, the immediate predecessor to the present state constitution, these two
provisions were combined into a single statement along with a prohibition on commodity speculation:
§ 8. Gambling; futures of agricultural products; lotteries
Section 8. Gambling is a vice and the Legislature shall pass laws to suppress it.
Gambling in futures on agricultural products or articles of necessity, where the intention
of the parties is not to make an honest and bona fide delivery, is declared to be against
public policy; and the Legislature shall pass laws to suppress it.
Lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets are prohibited in this State.
La. Const. of 1921, art. XIX, § 8.
148. La. Const. art. XII, § 6. As originally enacted, Section 6, like its predecessors, also
precluded the state from conducting lotteries.
Section 6. Lotteries; Gambling
Section 6. Neither the state nor any of its political subdivisions shall conduct a lottery.
Gambling shall be defined by and suppressed, by the legislature.
In 1990, Section 6 was amended to permit the state to conduct a lottery, but the prior language
directing the legislature to define and suppress gambling was retained. Today the provision reads,
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constitutional directive, the legislature in 1991 passed four statutes which together
provided for licensing of gambling in a wide variety of contexts, including: at a
land-based casino in New Orleans; 49 on cruiseships operating out of New
Orleans; 5 ° on riverboats operating on certain rivers in the state;15 1 and by
means of video poker machines located throughout the state.' 52 Not surprisingly,
suit was brought challenging these statutes on a number of grounds. The trial court
rejected all but one of these arguments, holding unconstitutional only so much of
the Casino Act as provided that Louisiana Economic Development and Gaming
Corporation (the "Gaming Corporation"), a state organ created to oversee that Act,
would not be subject to the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Service laws.'
After initially denying expedited handling, 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court
took the cases from the court of appeal and consolidated them for review. On
review, the supreme court affirmed the trial court in all respects. It agreed that the
Casino Act was unconstitutional insofar as it purported to exempt employees of the
Gaming Corporation from the requirements of the state Civil Service laws,' 5 but
in relevant part, as follows:
Section 6. Lotteries; Gambling
Section 6. (A) Lotteries. The legislature may provide for the creation and operation of
a state lottery....
(B) Gambling. Gambling shall be defined by and suppressed by the legislature.
149. The Louisiana Economic Development & Gaming Corp. Act (the "Casino Act"), 1992 La.
Acts No. 384, La. R.S. 4:601-686 & 14:90(E) (Supp. 1993).
150. The Cruiseship Gaming Act (the "Cruiseship Act"), 1991 La. Acts No. 289, La. R.S.
14:90(B) (Supp. 1993).
151. The Louisiana Riverboat Economic Development and Gaming Control Act (the "Riverboat
Act"), 1991 La. Acts No. 753, La. R.S. 4:501-562 & 14:90(D) (Supp. 1993).
152. The Video Draw Poker Devices Control Law (the "Video Poker Act"), 1991 La. Acts No.
1062, La. R.S. 33:4862.1-4862.19 (Supp. 1993).
153. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1128 (La. 1993).
154. Polk v. Edwards, 613 So. 2d 981 (La. 1993).
155. La. Const. art X, § I(A), provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Section 1. Civil Service Systems
(A) State Civil Service. The state Civil Service is established and includes all persons
holding offices and positions of trust or employment in the employ of the state, or any
instrumentality thereof. ..
Since the constitution thus requires that all state employees be covered by the state Civil Service, the
only issue was whether the Gaming Corporation is an instrumentality of the state. The Court had
no trouble concluding that the corporation is such a state instrumentality, noting the following: that
the corporation is owned by the state; that it was established by law to carry out a public purpose;
that its organic statute recites that it is "accountable to the governor, the legislature, and the people
of the state," La. R.S. 4:4602(A) (1992); that its board of directors is appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the Senate; that the Governor must approve the board's choice of its president; that the
corporation operates according to the Louisiana Administrative Procedures Act and the state
Procurement Code; that the fees charged by the corporation are subject to approval by the governor;
and that the corporation was statutorily vested with substantial administrative powers-including the
power to issue rules defining what forms of gambling will be permitted and how they may be
operated and the power to hear complaints charging violations of the Casino Act or of the
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concluded that those provisions were severable from the remainder of the Act. 156
It rejected more general challenges based on claims that the Casino, Cruiseship and
Riverboat Acts contravened state constitutional restrictions on local or special
laws," 7 that the composition and powers of the Gaming Corporation violated the
state constitution's requirement of separation of powers and its prohibition against
corporation's rules. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1145-57 (La. 1993). Since such broad
regulatory powers cannot constitutionally be delegated to any non-governmental agency, any body
holding such powers must be deemed an instrumentality of the state. Polk, 626 So. 2d at 1147
(citing State Licensing Bd. of Contractors v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 110 So. 2d 847, 849 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1959), affd, 240 La. 331, 123 So. 2d 76 (1960)).
156. Polk, 626 So. 2d at 1147-48. The statute contained no express statement regarding
severability. The court reaffirmed that, in such circumstances, "[t]he test for severability is whether
the unconstitutional portions of the statute are so interrelated and connected with the constitutional
parts that they cannot be separated without destroying the intention manifested by the legislature in
passing the act." Id. at 1148 (quoting State v. Azar, 539 So. 2d 1222, 1226 (La.), cert. denied sub
nom. Azar v. Louisiana 493 U.S. 823, 110 S. Ct. 82 (1989) and citing La. R.S. 24:175. Here, the
court correctly saw imposition of Civil Service protection for Gaming Corporation employees as no
bar to the central thrust of the Acts and, indeed, argued that such protection would to some extent
further the legislature's intent to maintain public confidence that gaming operations would be free
from corruption.
157. La. Const. art. III, § 12, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Section 12. Prohibited Local and Special Laws
Section 12 (A) Prohibitions. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the
legislature shall not pass a local or special law:
(7) Creating private corporations ... ; granting to any private corporation, association,
or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.
(10) Defining any crime.
(B) Additional Prohibition. The legislature shall not indirectly enact special or local laws
by the partial repeal or suspension of a general law.
Since the statutes at issue created a corporation and affected the definition of the crime of gambling,
the only question was whether they constituted "local" or "special" laws. Plaintiffs argued that they
were, pointing out that they were introduced in accordance with the requirements of La. Const. art
III, § 13, which governs the procedure for such acts, and that the Casino, Cruiseship and Riverboat
Acts all were limited in their application to particular geographic locations or waterways.
In rejecting these arguments, the supreme court initially refused to place significance on the fact
that the Acts were introduced as if they were local or special laws. As the court noted, such
procedures may be followed out of an abundance of caution and do not determine the nature of the
law. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d at 1128, 1133 (La. 1993) and cases cited therein. On the harder
question of how to define "local" and "special" laws, the Court began by noting that these terms are
not constitutionally defined and that state courts had previously defined them in multiple inconsistent
ways. Id. at 1134. After an extensive review of authorities, the court concluded that the essence of
the restriction does not turn upon whether a statute's primary effects are geographically limited.
Rather, the question is whether the statute seeks to further private or special interests, or instead, the
general health, safety and welfare interests of the state as a whole. Id. at 1134-37. The court
concluded that, since the power to define and regulate gambling falls within the police power of the
state and since the institution of gambling will affect the economic interests of the state as a whole,
the gaming laws fell into the latter category. Id. at 1136-38.
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unfettered delegation of legislative authority, 58 and that the statutes violated
various constitutionally guaranteed rights and powers of the city of New Orleans. 59
158. La. Const. art. 11, §§ I and 2 divide the powers of the state government into three branches
and prohibit any person holding office under any one of those branches from exercising powers
belonging to any of the others. Plaintiffs contended that statutory provisions giving the Gaming
Corporation power to determine what types of games could be operated-and thus which forms of
gambling would be excepted from general laws criminalizing gambling-violated the constitution,
both because the power to define gambling was one which the legislature could not delegate and
because such a power could not be exercised by a body composed of executive appointees. The
court brushed these objections aside without extended analysis. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128,
1141-42 (La. 1993). They may have been more difficult, however, than the court's opinion indicated.
Unlike the federal Supreme Court, Louisiana courts have continued to enforce limits on the power
of the legislature to delegate its lawmaking functions to executive officials or administrative agencies.
While the legislature may empower administrators to fill in the details of the legislative scheme or
to apply a statute to particular instances, the legislature must itself provide the "standards" according
to which that discretion is to be exercised. This rule of non-delegation of legislative power has
traditionally been applied with particular stringency with respect to definitions. See, e.g., State v.
Broom, 439 So. 2d 357 (La. 1983) (and cases cited); State v. All Pro Paint and Body Shop, 618 So.
2d 962 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) (holding improper a delegation of power to determine what
constituted "hazardous waste" for purposes of criminal prosecution). Here, the court did not explain
whether or how the relevant statutes provided significant standards to guide the Gaming Corporation
in its efforts, and thus the non-delegation challenge would appear to have merit.
Though the Polk court did not directly so argue, it may be that an analytic distinction can be drawn
between administrative acts defining crimes and those which merely permit administrative officers
to grant an exception to otherwise applicable general criminal statutes. See, e.g., State v. Morgan,
238 La. 829, 116 So. 2d 682 (1959) (upholding statute criminalizing introduction of certain specified
items of contraband into prisons, unless authorized by the officer in charge of that prison, against
non-delegation challenge), which was cited by the court in Polk. Nonetheless, unfettered
administrative discretion to grant exceptions to criminal law could itself become problematic and
some appropriate standards should be required in such circumstances as well. Alternatively, though
the Polk court did not argue the point, it appears that the legislature's intentions regarding what types
of games were to be permitted at the casino and on the gambling boats were made sufficiently clear
in the governing statutes. La. R.S. 4:504(10) (respecting riverboat gambling) and La. R.S. 4:607(12)
(respecting casino gambling) may well define "Game" in sufficient detail to give the Gaming
Corporation and the reviewing courts adequate guidance as to what sorts of gambling the legislature
intended to permit.
159. La. Const. art. VI, § 4 confirms the powers of local governments, such as the city of New
Orleans, which operate under "home rule" charters. Since New Orleans' charter grants it the general
power to levy taxes and license fees, petitioners argued that so much of the challenged statutes as
limited the power of the city to tax gambling operations violated that constitutional guarantee. As
the court noted, however, the charter emanates from the legislature and such legislative delegations
can always be modified or rescinded by the legislature. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1142-43
(La. 1993) (citing La. Const. art. VI, § 9(B); Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1984); City of
New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318, 1321 (La. 1983)).
La. Const. art. VI, § 14(A), provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o law requiring increased
expenditures for wages, [or] hours ... of political subdivision employees ... shall become effective
until approved by ordinance enacted by the governing authority of the affected political subdivision
or until the legislature appropriates funds for the purpose to the affected political subdivision. .. ."
The Polk court construed this constitutional provision narrowly, distinguishing between state laws
that directly mandate increased local expenditures, which are governed by § 14(A), and state laws that
impose only incidental burdens on local governments, which are not. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d
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In addition, in what may be the most far-reaching aspect of its opinion, the
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that such a wholesale opening of the state to
video poker and casino-type gambling violated the constitutional directive that the
legislature "suppress" such activity. The court began its analysis by reciting
familiar boilerplate that "all statutory enactments are presumed to be constitution-
al," that the legislature, as representative of the state's citizenry, "may enact any
legislation that the state constitution does not explicitly prohibit," and that a litigant
attacking the constitutionality of legislation, "must establish clearly and convincing-
ly that the constitutional aim was to deny to the legislature the power to enact the
legislation" at issue."6 In concluding that the constitution's directive to "sup-
press" gambling did not constitute such an "explicit" limit on the legislature's
discretion, the Court relied on three related arguments. First, it characterized the
directive as non-self-operating;' 6 that is to say, as merely "hortatory" rather than
mandatory in nature. 161 Second, the Court relied upon prior jurisprudence, which
had construed similar language from the constitution of 1921 as having the effect
of delegating, "to the Legislature and the Legislature alone, the power to suppress
gambling, and to determine how, when, where and in what respects gambling shall
be prohibited or permitted."'' 63 Finally, and apparently most important, the court
relied on both the evident familiarity of the constitutional drafters with that prior
jurisprudence and extensive excerpts from the debates on the floor of the
constitutional convention of 1973 to demonstrate that the framers of the 1974
constitution did not understand or intend that Section 6 would prevent the
legislature from passing laws permitting gambling activities of this type.'6
1128, 1143-45 (La. 1993).
Finally, La. Const. art. VI, § 17, provides that local governments may "adopt regulations for land
use, zoning, and historic preservation ...." The court brushed aside challenges based on this
section, professing itself unable to see how a major gambling casino in the heart of New Orleans
would adversely affect the city's ability to enforce zoning and similar regulations. Polk v. Edwards,
626 So. 2d 1128, 1143-44 (La. 1993).
160. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1993) (citing, among other cases, Board of
Directors of Louisiana Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384 (La. 1988) and State Bond
Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, 525 So. 2d 521 (La. 1988)).
161. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1138 (La. 1993). The court contrasted the direct
prohibition of lotteries contained in the original version of § 6, quoted supra at note 148, with that
section's merely directory language regarding other forms of gambling. While the former sentence
apparently would have been construed to be mandatory and self-operative, the latter sentence was not.
162. See Lee Hargrave, "Statutory' and "Hortatory'" Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev.. 647, 677-81 (1983), describing the decision to continue the state
constitution's prior directive against gambling as essentially a "sermon" which the delegates added
solely to defuse potential opposition to the new charter, rather than because they expected that it
would have any specific legal effect.
163. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1139 (La. 1993) (quoting Gandolfo v. Louisiana State
Racing Comm'n, 227 La. 45, 78 So. 2d 504, 514 (1954), which had held that the 1921 constitution's
directive to the legislature to "suppress" gambling did not preclude the legislature from authorizing
pari-mutuel betting on horse races in the state).
164. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1139-41 (La. 1993). The court's argument with respect
to framers' intent rested on three legs. First, the court argued that whether or not Gandolfo had been
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2. Succession of Lauga and the Prohibition Against Laws that "Abolish"
Forced Heirship
In 1920, the Louisiana legislature passed laws authorizing citizens of this
state to establish trusts, of the sort that had been developed at common law. In
response, proponents of Louisiana's civil law tradition inserted a provision into
the 1921 constitution which limited the legislature's power to authorize such
trusts and prohibited laws "abolishing forced heirship.' ' 165  Article XII, section
5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 continued this prohibition in modified
form, retaining the prohibition on any law which would "abolish" forced
heirship, but specifically leaving "determination of forced heirs, the amount of
correctly decided as a matter of first impression, it was the law at the time the 1974 constitution was
drafted. Since the drafters were aware of that decision and chose to retain essentially the same
language in the new constitution, their intention to adopt Gandolfo's result into the new constitution
could be presumed. Id. at 1138-40, 1141. Second, the court quoted colloquies from the convention
floor between delegates Jenkins and Gravel, and between delegates Zervignon and Chatelain, to show
that the convention understood that the legislature would retain power, despite § 6, to permit even
"Nevada-type, completely open gambling" in Louisiana. Id. at 1139-41 (quoting IX Records of the
Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Verbatim Convention Transcripts [hereinafter
"Records: Convention Transcripts"] 3223, 3228-29, 113th Day Proceedings, January 9, 1974).
Finally, this understanding of the drafters' intent was strengthened by the convention's specific
handling of the floor proposal that eventually became § 6. As originally proposed, that section would
have directed that gambling be defined and "prohibited," rather than "suppressed" by the legislature.
That language was changed by the convention, apparently in an effort to avoid changing the Gandolfo
result. Id. at 1140-41 (citing Records: Convention Transcripts, at 3233).
165. See generally Lee Hargrave, supra note 146, at 188. As originally enacted, the 1921
constitution provided, in relevant part, as follows:
Section 16. No law shall be passed abolishing forced heirship or authorizing the creation
of substitutions, fidei commissa or trust estates; except that the Legislature may authorize
the creation of trust estates for a period not exceeding ten years after the death of the
donor; provided, that where a natural person is the direct beneficiary said period may be
made to extend until ten years after his majority; and provided further, that this
prohibition as to trust estates or fidei commissa shall not apply to donations strictly for
educational, charitable or religious purposes.
La. Const. of 1921, art. IV, § 16. This section was thereafter amended several times, in order to
loosen the restrictions on the legislature with respect to trusts and to address specific problems such
as the treatment of adopted children. The prohibition on laws "abolishing" forced heirship was,
however, retained. As of the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1973, the section provided as
follows:
§ 16. Trusts; forced heirship; abolition prohibited; adopted children
Section 16. The legislature may authorize the creation of express trusts for any
purpose.... Substitutions not in trust are and remain prohibited; but trusts may contain
substitutions to the extent authorized by the Legislature. No law shall be passed
abolishing forced heirship; but the legitime may be placed in trust to the extent authorized
by the Legislature. Children lawfully adopted shall become forced heirs to the same
extent as if born to the adopter and shall retain their rights as heirs of their blood
relatives, but their blood relatives shall have their rights of inheritance from these children
terminated.
La. Const. of 1921, art. IV, § 4, as amended.
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the forced portion, and the grounds for disinherison" for decision by the
legislature.'66 In 1989 and 1990, the legislature passed laws which greatly
modified the definition of forced heirs. 167  Whereas prior law defined any
"child" as a forced heir, the new provisions restricted that status to a much
smaller class--descendants who had not reached twenty-three years of age or
who could demonstrate that they lacked capacity to manage their affairs.
168
Predictably, suit was brought challenging these statutes on a number of grounds.
The trial court declared amended Civil Code article 1493 unconstitutional on two
grounds: because it violated Article XII, section 5; and because it constituted an
arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious discrimination on the basis of age, in
violation of Article I, section 3 of the state constitution.,
69
On review, the supreme court affirmed the trial court, amending the
judgment below only to declare the amendatory acts of 1989 and 1991
unconstitutional in their entirety, 70 and to base its ruling solely on Article XII,
166. La. Const. art. XII, § 5 provides as follows:
Section 5. Forced Heirship and Trusts
Section 5. No law shall abolish forced heirship. The determination of forced heirs, the
amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for disinherison shall be provided by law.
Trusts may be authorized by law, and a forced portion may be placed in trust.
The locution "provided by law" was used by the drafters of the 1974 constitution to mean "provided
by legislation." In the absence of limiting language, such language was intended by the constitution's
drafter's to confer discretion on the legislature to deal with the referenced issue as it chose. Lee
Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term: Louisiana
Constitutional Law, 38 La. L. Rev. 438, 442 (1978) (quoting Justice Tate, the Chairman of the
Convention's Committee on Style and Drafting, writing in Board of Elementary and Secondary Educ.
v. Nix, 347 So. 2d 147, 151 (La. 1977)).
167. 1989 La. Acts No. 788 and 1990 La. Acts No. 147, codified at La. R.S. 9:2501.
168. The statutory revisions resulted in amendment of Louisiana Civil Code arts. 1492 through
1495. The core of the change was embodied in the revision of La. Civ. Code art. 1493. Prior to the
revisions, that article provided as follows:
Art. 1493. Disposable portion when children survive
Donations inter vivos or mortis causa cannot exceed three-fourths of the property of the
disposer, if he leaves, at his decease, one child; and one-half, if he leaves two or more
children.
Under the name of children are included descendants of whatever degree they be, it
being understood that they are only counted for the child they represent.
After revision, Article 1493 provided as follows:
Art. 1493. Forced heirs; representation of forced heirs
Forced heirs are descendants of the first degree who have not attained the age of twenty-
three years, or of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are
incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates.
For purposes of forced heirship, representation of a descendant of the first degree who
predeceased the donor is permitted if that descendant would not have attained the age of
twenty-three years at the donor's death.
The amount of the forced portion-one-quarter of the estate if there is one forced heir, one-half if
there are two or more-was not changed, but specification was moved to La. Civ. Code art. 1495.
169. Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (La. 1993).
170. Id.
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section 5.7 The supreme court began its analysis of Section 5 by reviewing
the long history of forced heirship in the law of Louisiana, reciting the
fundamental purposes and essentials of the concept-i.e., avoidance of
accumulation of excessive fortunes, prevention of encumbrance of assets by the
deceased, and equality of treatment of children-and reaffirming the importance
of the institution to the state. 72 In concluding that the prohibition on legisla-
tion in Section 5-unlike the directive in Section 6, discussed above-should be
read to limit the legislature's freedom of action, the Court relied on several
arguments. First, it characterized as mere dictum, and thus refused to rely on,
prior caselaw which had construed predecessor language from the constitution
of 1921, also prohibiting abolition of forced heirship, as meaning only "that
forced heirship cannot be done away with wholly, wiped out or destroyed," and
that it "does not prohibit the legislature from regulating or restricting the rights
of forced heirs."'' 7  Second, while recognizing that the legislature retained
authority to modify the rules of forced heirship, the court argued that permitting
too much leeway to the legislature would lead to the "absurd consequence" of
reducing what the court saw as a clear constitutional limit on the legislature to
merely hortatory status. 74  Finally, the court articulated at length a theory of
constitutional interpretation that focused primarily upon the necessity of fidelity
to the intentions of the ratifiers of the constitution, 7 5 and that those intentions
can best be reconstructed by adherence to certain traditional rules: that "clear
and unambiguous" constitutional provisions should generally be applied as
written; that constitutional provisions should be construed as a whole, harmoniz-
ing all elements so as to give effect to each; and that where a provision is similar
to a predecessor in a prior constitution, the latter section will be construed like
the former.7 6  Specifically, the court held that where, as assertedly was the
171. Id. at 1158. The court thus did not address plaintiff's age discrimination arguments.
172. Id. at 1159-61. The court relied heavily on a series of academic commentaries reaffirming
the basic values behind, and importance of, the institution of forced heirship, and criticizing
legislative acts which interfered unduly with its basic tenets. Prominent among these are: Katherine
S. Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable "Revolution", 50 La. L. Rev.
409 (1990); Thomas B. Lemann, In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 20 (1977); Gerald
Le Van, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 29 (1977); Joseph Dainow, The Early
Sources of Forced Heirship; Its History in Texas and Louisiana, 4 La. L. Rev. 42 (1941); and Harriet
S. Daggett, General Principles of Succession on Death in Civil Law, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 399 (1937).
173. Lauga, 624 So. 2d at 1164 (discussing Succession of Earhart, 220 La. 817, 824, 57 So. 2d
695, 697 (1952)).
174. Id. at 1164.
175. Id. at 1165 (citing Devlin, supra note 39, at 689-90. The court was certainly correct that
it was the act of ratification that gave the state constitution its binding force and that the ultimate
touchstone of constitutional interpretation is the meaning that could reasonably be ascribed to a
knowledgeable, but objective, ratifier. However, as will be developed below, this does not
necessarily mean that clear, objectively manifested evidence of the intentions and understandings of
the framers should be ignored. On the contrary, such evidence may be the best indication of what
the intentions of the ratifiers were.
176. Id. at 1165 (citing cases and other authorities).
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case in Lauga, the constitutional provision is "clear," debates among the
constitution's drafters cannot be relied upon to interpret or modify that text. 77
Applying these principles, the court held that the 1989 and 1990 amend-
ments, unlike prior legislative modifications of forced heirship, abrogated core
principles of the institution-primarily, each child's individual right to an equal
share of the legitime-and thus constituted an effective "abolition" of the
institution. Despite language from pre-1974 caselaw and the statements of some
of the drafters of Section 6, the court found that the prohibitory language of
Section 5 requires preservation of more than the vestigial remnant of forced
heirship left after those amendments.
17 1
3. Of Prohibitions, Mandates, and Implied Limits on Legislative Power
As should be apparent from the above recitation, the rhetoric and results in
Polk and Lauga are difficult to reconcile. In both cases, the Court was required
to construe a constitutional provision that both empowered the legislature (in
Section 6 by authorizing the legislature to "define" gambling; in Section 5 by
authorizing the legislature to determine the identity of "forced heirs [and] the
amount of the forced portion") and purported to limit the legislature's discretion
in exercising that power (in Section 6 by directing the legislature to "suppress"
gambling; in Section 5 by forbidding the legislature from passing laws to
"abolish" forced heirship). In both situations, caselaw interpreting analogous
177. Id. at 1168-69 (citing cases).
The convention debates on what was to become art. XII, § 5, do not reflect any clear consensus
among the delegates regarding how that section should be interpreted. Some speakers indicated that
by guaranteeing forced heirship in the constitution, § 5 would effectively prevent the legislature from
derogating from the essence of that institution. See, e.g., remarks of Delegate Stinson introducing
the proposal and describing the institution as one according to which "children cannot be, as in
Texas, for example, be left a dollar or five dollars ...." IX Records: Convention Transcripts, 3073,
107th Day Proceedings, January 3, 1974. Other delegates, however, emphasized then-existing
decisional law and the second sentence of § 5 as granting power to the legislature to define the class
of forced heirs and the amount of their forced portion any way it chooses-even to the point of
eliminating forced heirship as a practical reality. See, e.g., the colloquy between delegates Fontenot
and Stinson, reaffirming that the legislature has full power to determine the identity of forced heirs;
IX Records: Convention Transcripts, 3073, 107th Day Proceedings, January 3, 1974, and the remarks
of delegate Tobias: "As I presently read Louisiana constitution and statutes, the legislature could
very simply say that each child is a forced heir to the extent of one dollar." IX Records: Convention
Transcripts, 3075, 107th Day Proceedings, January 3, 1974.
178. Lauga, 625 So. 2d at 1169-70. This result does not imply that all substantial changes in
the rules governing forced heirship will be held unconstitutional. Compare, e.g., Succession of
Williams, 593 So. 2d 658, 659 n.4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 608 So, 2d 973
(La. 1992), in which the courts construed a will in accord with 1981 La. Acts No. 442, which
abolished forced heirship for ascendants. While it could be argued that the line between permissible
and impermissible modifications of forced heirship is essentially arbitrary, it appears that the changes
discussed in Lauga cut more closely to the heart of the institution than did the changes implicitly
approved in Williams.
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sections of the 1921 constitution had construed the legislature's power
broadly, 79 and the delegates to the constitutional convention were aware of
these prior constructions when they chose to phrase the 1974 constitution in
similar terms. In both cases, the convention debates indicated that at least some
of the drafters believed and intended that the limiting language of the constitu-
tional provision would be merely hortatory, and would impose no substantial
obstacle to legislative will.8 0 But in both cases, a reasonable ratifier reading
only the plain terms of the relevant provision could well have concluded that the
limiting language did in fact substantially restrict how far the legislature could
go in legalizing gambling or limiting forced heirship. Yet the court reached
opposite results in the two cases. In Polk it emphasized the "empowering"
language of the constitutional provision, the need for challengers to clearly and
convincingly show an "explicit" constitutional provision by which the framers
intended to limit the legislature, the persuasiveness of prior precedent, and the
utility of convention records as an indication of framers' intent. In Lauga, it
emphasized the limiting language of the constitutional provision, the need to
interpret in light of what the ratifiers may have understood the "plain language"
of the constitution to mean, the narrowness of precedent, and the unreliability of
convention transcripts as indications of interpretive intent. In neither case did the
court clearly articulate why it chose to rely on one set of arguments over the
other.
To be sure, both Polk and Lauga were "hard cases" which presented the
court with difficult issues of constitutional interpretation. However, they need
not result in the proverbial "bad law." On the contrary, by forcing the court to
confront basic issues regarding interpretation of express and implied constitution-
al limits on legislative action, these cases may have laid the foundation for a
more consistent and better founded interpretive methodology.
Three useful principles, in particular, may be derived from these cases.
First, Lauga recognizes that general statements of principle in the Louisiana
constitution may serve as substantive, judicially enforceable restraints on
legislative action. In doing so, it stands against the unfortunate trend of many
recent cases, which have required challengers to carry the virtually impossible
burden of showing an "explicit" constitutional provision which "clearly and
convincingly" manifests that the framers and ratifiers intended to prohibit the
179. Compare, e.g, Gandolfo v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 227 La. 45, 78 So. 2d 504,
514 (1954) (upholding the legislature's power to legalize betting on horses), with Succession of
Earhart, 220 La. 817, 824, 57 So. 2d 695, 697 (1952) (upholding a will which placed forced portion
in trust).
180. See discussion supra at notes 164 & 177. Indeed, the argument that the framers intended
to confer broad discretion on the legislature is even stronger with respect to § 5 than it is with respect
to § 6. The language of § 5 differs from its 1921 predecessor primarily in that § 5 specifically
empowers the legislature to determine the identity of forced heirs and the amounts of the forced
portion-a power that was only implicit under the 1921 language.
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legislature from enacting the precise statute which it enacted.,81 Nor does
Lauga stand alone in its recognition of the possibility of implied state constitu-
tional limits on legislative action. In Chamberlain v. State,'8 2 the court
construed Article XII, section 10 of the state constitution, which provides that the
state shall not be "immune" from suit and liability in contract and tort ac-
tions, 83 to also prevent the legislature from enacting a statutory cap of
$500,000 on the general damages recoverable from the state in such actions.
Justice Hall, writing for the majority, admitted that the constitution is "silent" on
the precise issue of damage caps.' Yet that majority was willing to rely on
what it saw as the historical underpinnings of Section 10(A), together with some
rather venerable authority, 85 to hold that Section 10(A) should be read to
impliedly forbid the legislature from enacting such a cap.
8 6
Regardless of one's views of the precise results of Lauga and Chamberlain,
the Louisiana Supreme Court should be applauded for beginning to move,
181. See, e.g., Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 532 So. 2d 1372
(1988); Board of Directors of La. Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384 (La. 1988); State
Bond Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, 525 So. 2d 521 (La. 1988).
182. 624 So. 2d 874 (1993). The Chamberlain decision is more fully analyzed by my colleague,
Professor Crawford, elsewhere in this issue. William E. Crawford, Torts, Developments in the Law
1992-93, 54 La. L. Rev. 807 (1994).
183. La. Const. art. XII, § 10 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(A) No himunity in Contract and Tort. Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political
subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or
property.
(B) Waiver of Other Suits. The legislature may authorize other suits against the state,
a state agency, or a political subdivision. A measure authorizing suit shall waive
immunity from suit and liability.
(C) Procedure; Judgments. The legislature shall provide a procedure for suits against
the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision. It shall provide for the effect of a
judgment, but no public property or public funds shall be subject to seizure....
184. Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 886.
185. The majority opinion in Chamberlain relied on only a single precedent, Tanner v. Beverley
Country Club, 47 So. 2d 905, 912-13 (1950), which held that provisions of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1921 dividing the state into judicial districts and setting the jurisdiction of these district courts
should be read to impliedly prohibit the legislature from enacting a statute which purported to allow
plaintiffs in certain nuisance suits to sue in "any" district court of the state. Chamberlain also quoted
Tanner's discussion of Thomas Cooley. author of a noted 19th century treatise on state constitutional
law, setting out the circumstances in which such an implied limitation might be found:
"To create an implied prohibition there must be some express affirmative provi-
sion. * * *" Or. as otherwise stated by Cooley in his Treatise [citation omitted] "... the
Constitution by its inherent terms may of necessity prohibit certain acts of a legislature
by reason of the inherent conflict that would arise between the terms of the Constitution
and the power claimed in favor of the legislature." ... "Every positive direction contains
an implication against anything contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint the
purpose of that provision." [Emphasis in original.]
Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 887 (quoting Tanner, 47 So. 2d at 913 (quoting Thomas Cooley, 1
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 176 n.4 (8th ed. 1927))).
186. Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 879, 886-87.
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however hesitantly, toward a recognition that not every claim that government
action contravenes the state constitution must be always supported by reference
to a "specific" text that "explicitly" forbids the precise act at issue. As has been
argued previously in this series,'87 such a narrow view would be at odds with
one of the basic intentions of the drafters and ratifiers of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974-that is, to replace an unwieldy constitution encumbered
by myriads of detailed statute-like provisions with a streamlined document that
manifests the intentions of those framers and ratifiers largely through statements
of general principle rather than explicit commands and prohibitions.'
8 8
The second principle which may emerge from Polk, Lauga and their progeny
could be a more sophisticated and consistent approach by Louisiana courts to the
question of how to evaluate transcripts of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of 1973, or other indications of the intentions of the drafters of the
current state constitution. Polk and Lauga, between them, probe the far ends of
the spectrum of possible uses of such data: Polk, like many recent cases,
embraced excerpts from the convention transcripts and relied heavily upon them
in interpreting Article XII, section 6;189 Lauga, in contrast, utterly rejected any
reliance on such transcript colloquies and relied instead on an independent
reconstruction of what the court believed the ratifiers of the current constitution
should have understood it to mean.' 90 But as is often the case, the optimal
approach should probably incorporate elements of both of these extremes.
The court was undoubtedly correct when it held, in Lauga, that the ultimate
touchstone of state constitutional interpretation should be the understanding that
could be reasonably ascribed to the ratifiers, as opposed to the drafters, of that
constitution.' 9' However, that does not mean that a court should ignore evi-
dence-whether culled from convention transcripts or from any other
source-which may shed light on how the drafters of the constitution understood
that their words would be interpreted. It must be remembered that the "intent"
which is ascribed to the hypothetical objective but knowledgeable ratifier is an
artificial construct, not a historical fact. In creating that construct, courts can and
should rely on all useful sources of information regarding how the constitutional
text was likely to have been understood at the time, including relevant evidence
of the drafters' understandings. The reasons are evident. The convention
delegates who wrote the constitution were not wholly "apart" from the people
who ratified it; rather those delegates were appointed or elected from among the
people, by the people, to represent the people. The delegates were the most
187. John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments in the Low 1987-88, 49 La. L.
Rev. 395, 414-420 (1988).
188. See, e.g., Hargrave, supra note 34, at 17-18, describing the efforts of the drafters of the
1974 constitution to shorten the document by, among other things, replacing statutory detail with
general statements of principle.
189. See supra discussion at note 165.
190. See supra discussion at notes 176-178.
191. Lauga, 624 So. 2d at 1164-65, and cases cited.
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knowledgeable contemporary commentators on the constitution they drafted, in
the best position to understand and articulate the nuances of meaning that were
then attached to its words. Thus it may frequently be the case that the debates
of the drafters will be the best available evidence as to how the constitution's
language was likely to have been understood by the ratifiers. Courts should not
cut themselves off from such a useful source of information.
Nor should courts be dissuaded by the old shibboleth that "the debates of a
convention ... cannot be resorted to for the purpose of varying the otherwise
clear and unambiguous meaning of a constitutional provision."' 92 Though the
concept might be a legitimate one in the small number of cases to which it
actually applies, the difficulty remains that few disputed constitutional provisions
really possess such a "clear and unambiguous meaning." Certainly in a case like
Lauga, where three justices read the disputed provision in a manner completely
different than did the majority, 193 it would seem that one would be hard put to
argue that the reading adhered to by either group of justices was so "clear and
unambiguous" that extrinsic evidence of meaning should be ignored.
Finally, the results in Polk and Lauga can be reconciled and, as reconciled,
suggest a possible refinement in the court's handling of the distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing constitutional provisions. Though sections
5 and 6 of Article XII both purport to limit the discretion of the legislature, they
do so in crucially different ways. The limit imposed by Section 5 is phrased in
negative, prohibitory terms-as a statement of what the legislature is not to do.
In contrast, the limiting language of Section 6 is phrased in positive, mandatory
or directory terms-as a statement of what the legislature is to do. Louisiana
courts have long held that particular constitutional provisions directing the
legislature to act are neither self-executing nor judicially enforceable.' 94 In
contrast, particularly where, as was arguably the case in Lauga, individual rights
are at issue, constitutional provisions forbidding the legislature from doing certain
things are generally construed to be both self-executing and judicially enforce-
able.'95  If such a distinction were to be made explicit and consistently
enforced, those who draft and vote on amendments to the present state
192. Lauga, 624 So. 2d at 1165, citing numerous prior cases that have repeated the same maxim.
193. The dissenters were Justices Marcus, Hall, and Kimball. Justice Kimball wrote a detailed
dissent, explaining why Article XII, section 5 should be read, as was Section 6 in Polk, to empower
the legislature rather than to restrict its authority over the institution of forced heirship. Lauga, 624
So. 2d at 1184-1200. The argument here is not that either group of justices was correct or incorrect
on the merits, but rather only to point out that "clear and unambiguous" constitutional language
usually exists only in the eye of the beholder.
194. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 324 So. 2d 395 (La. 1975) (holding that the directive in La.
Const. art. 1, § 13, that the legislature "provide a uniform system for securing and compensating
qualified counsel for indigent" was unenforceable); State v. Bryant, 324 So. 2d 389 (La. 1975)
(same).
195. The supreme court made this point explicitly in Chamberlain, flatly stating that
constitutional prohibitions on legislative action are self-executing. Chamberlain, 624 So. 2d at 881-
82 (citing Cooley, supra note 185, at 167 n.1).
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constitution-and who may in the future once again undertake the task of
creating a new charter for the state-will have a better opportunity to predict the
effect of their words, and to choose their words accordingly.

